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ABSTRACT
The concepts of strategic planning are discussed, followed
by a description and critique of three widely used methods of
strategic planning: growth/share portfolios, market attractive-
ness/ business position profiles, and industry maturity/position
portfolios. A model of the strategic planning process is for-
mulated which, when coupled with the market attractiveness/
business position profile strategy technique, is appropriate
for examining service organizations and professional service
organizations in particular.
This framework is applied to a marketing consulting firm
to diagnose its current portfolio of business and make recommen-
dations for change. Information from four sources is used:
interviews with key personnel at the firm, industry sales
statistics, interviews with clients, and interviews with
competitors.
The results of the study are in five parts. First, the
consulting firm is divided into eight strategic business units
defined primarily along industry dimensions. Second, these
business units when assessed for market attractiveness and
competitive business position are found to be widely distributed
along these measures; however, no business unit is diagnosed as
having both low market attractiveness and poor business position.
Third, subjective projections of factors critical for business
unit success reveal businesses gradually moving toward the
extremes of high and low market attractiveness and business
position, some businesses having the potential to drop to low
market attractiveness and poor business position. Fourth,
three alternative strategies are presented to close gaps between
organizational objectives and the projected business portfolio:
market research/planning, industry consulting, or strategic
planning. Although a cautious recommendation is made to focus
on market research/planning, the actual strategy selection
should follow an iterative process where organizational and
professional goals are compared to the requirements and results
of strategic options. Finally, organizational and marketing
changes are suggested to complement any strategy choice.
These general recommendations emphasize staff development,
management efforts, increased promotion, and improved pre-
sentation/report style.
The case study is a strategic audit, not a complete
strategic planning exercise. It points out areas of concern
and possible options. In-depth investigation by line management
is required to sort out the details necessary to formulate and
implement a polished strategic plan.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Arnoldo C. Hax
Title: Professor of Management Science
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last -wenty to thirty years have seen the rapid
emergence of a new discipline: corporate strategy. It is a
relative newcomer to business schools and industry because its
development has closely paralleled the recent growth in the
number of large, product/divisional firms with their many layers
of organizational hierarchy and numerous diversified products in
widely dispersed markets. At presenti the discipline has
reached a stage of being useful but imprecise. There is some
broad agreement on what strategy is, and basic tools have been
developed to facilitate its formulation in certain settings.
However,, the methods and theories are not fully integrated with
other business functional disciplines, nor are they robust
enough to apply generally without enormous amounts of subjective
judgement. In the parlance of one of the more successful
strategy models, corporate strategic planning is probably a
"question mark" in the portfolio of business functions and
methodologies.
Most of the strategic planning models in use today were
conceived with major manufacturing industries in mind as the
source data (and as potential clients of the methods). As
such, they are shaped by the economics of production common
to such businesses.
The purpose of this thesis is to take the current models
out of that context and apply them to a very intangible service
industry, management consulting. We will first examine the main
concepts of strategy formulation and then describe and critique
three widely used methods of strategic planning. We then
specify our own model of the strategic planning process which
we believe is general enough to be applicable to both manufactur-
ing and service industries if the tools used in specific steps
are chosen carefully. The balance of the thesis is a test of
our approach through a case study of a marketing consulting
firm considering broadening its involvement in management con-
sulting.
We wish to thank the consulting firm and its staff
for the opportunity to work with them. They were very patient
and candid in providing information and support for us to test
the methods of strategic planning while we developed our skills
as consultants. Their clients and competitors were also very
gracious in consenting to be interviewed for this study.
Finally, we extend our thanks to our thesis chairman, Prof.
Arnoldo C. Hax, for his academic and personal support through-
out the project.
II. TRADITIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING METHODS
II.A. The Attributes of Strategy
II.A.1 Basic Concepts
One of the frustrations of the corporate strategy disci-
pline is that it is relatively easy to normatively describe what
corporate strategy is but very difficult to translate that into
specific plans. This is nicely exemplified by the basic defi-
nition given by Chandler, for whom strategy is
...the determination of the basic long term goals
and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption
of courses of action and the allocation of resources
necessary for carrying out these goals 1
Clearly strategy is intimately tied to the goals of the organiza-
tion; a strategy is only meaningful as a means to an end. But
it is also intuitively apparent that strategy is not something
that can be chosen and imposed on an organization purely on
the basis of the goals of management: "Strategy is more
condition-driven than ambition-driven."
Most approaches recognize that strategy is concerned
with the relationship of a firm's skills and resources to the
opportunities in its market environment. For example, Salter
describes a six-stage strategic planning process:3
Chandler, Alfred D., Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters
in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise
(M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1962) p. 13.
2Blackmer, Kathleen C., "Principles of Strategic Planning,"
A Management System for the 1980s (Arthur D. Little, Inc.,
1979) p. 9.
3Salter, M.S. and Weinhold, W.A., Diversification through
Acquisition, Strategies for Creating Economic Value (The
Free Press, St. Paul, Minnesota, 1979) pp. 49-64.
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1. Gather strategic intelligence
.what the company does and how it defines its business
.company strengths and weaknesses
.future opportunities and risks
2. Set strategic goals and objectives
3. Define alternative policies for achieving objectives
4. Choose a strategy
.an internally consistent set of policies which fit
the resources and purposes of the firm
5. Develop a time sequence for implementation
6. Review the strategy's performance and assumptions
Here we see that goals and strategy are determined based on the
company's strengths and weaknesses relative to future opportuni-
ties and threats.
To use a model like the above, it is necessary to be more
specific .about the strategic intelligence data base compiled in
step one. Bowman summarizes the strategy model implicit in many
corporate policy textbooks and is more specific about the source
and nature of strategic information. His model is visually
represented as follows:4
Environment Company
Strategy
Implementation
Control
4Bowman,Edward H., "Epistemology, Corporate Strategy, and
Academe," Sloan Management Review, Winter 1979, pp. 35-50.
This model begins with goals, which include profit, growth,
risk aversion, and social responsibility objectives; these may
be conflicting and reconcilable only through tradeoffs. The
environment dimension is an assessment of the levels and trends
of products, customers, competition, technology, and the
implied opportunities or risks for present, near, and potential
products/markets. The company's strengths and weaknesses are
measured relative to its own past, other firms, and normative
or ideal standards. Strategy is the decision of how to expand,
add, modify, or eliminate some aspects of the company's
"product/market domain." This may be done with market segmen-
tation, product differentiation, innovation, price leadership,
etc. Ineffect, the strategy is an attempt to earn monopoly
rents on factors unique to the firm.
II.A.2 Goals and Objectives
Implicit in the above models is the idea that goals,
objectives, and strategies have different levels corresponding
to levels and business units in the organization. We will
use the term "goals" to refer to general, open-ended aspira-
tions of an organization, such as maximizing profits or
improving the community arts programs. "Objectives" will mean
specific, achievable targets which are necessary steps in the
attainment of goals. As such, an objective requires the goal,
a target value, and a time frame within which the target value
5is to be realized. Goals and objectives at any level of the
5Hofer, Charles W. and Schendel, Dan, Strategy Formulation:
Analytical Concepts (West Publishing Co., 1978) pp. 20-22.
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organization should be consistent with themselves (or ranked
with priorities to resolve conflicts) and with available
strategies.
There is some disagreement in the literature over when
goals, objectives, and strategies should be set in the strategic
planning process. In practice, they are probably all defined
iteratively, but it is useful to partially separate goal and
strategy formulation. This allows the organization to set
higher aspirations than it might if the two were merged while
allowing moderation of unrealistic desires. Strategy is not
comprised of marginal changes in existing operations to improve
efficiency; it is concerned with appropriate responses to
infrequent changes in the conditions for effectiveness.
The specification of tentative objectives is also a
necessary precursor to strategy formulation; these may be refined
after specific strategies are selected. To keep the goals and
strategy tightly linked in the implementation phase, it is a
good idea that final objectives be defined in terms of variables
used to assess and select the strategy. These objectives identi-
fy the performance expectations for each business or program
in terms of sales, growth, market share, return on investment,
net income, cash flow, etc.
II.A.3 Levels of Strategy
In order to be operationally useful, corporate objectives
should be factored into business unit objectives and then into
business functional objectives. Corresponding to objectives,
there are three levels of strategy:
13
1. Corporate level, addressing the question of what
set of businesses the firm should be in;
2. Business level, addressing how to compete in
particular product/market segments; and
3. Functional level, addressing the maximization of
resource productivity at the business level.
II.A.4 . Strategy and Organizational Structure
It is important to recognize that a strategic decision
may require a change in organizational structure. This inter-
action of strategy and structure is described in much of the
literature; indeed it is the main thesis of Chandler's Strategy
and Structure that "structure follows strategy." Greiner is
more specific on this relationship.6 He suggests that as firms
grow through stages from the entrepreneurial, single product
business to multi-product/market enterprises, there will be
transitional crises in the capacity of the organizational
structure to meet the demands placed upon it. At such times
it will be insufficient to simply enlarge the organizational
structure with more layers and more people. Instead, complete
reorganizations will be necessary with the structure (and
particular managers) chosen based on the ability to accommodate
the problems of the organization in the new phase. Moreover,
this evolution of organizational structure is a reasonably well-
defined sequence observed in most firms: from entrepreneurial to
functional, product-divisional, central with divisionalization,
and finally matrix structure. Thus, an important input and
6Greiner, Larry E., "Evolution and Revolution as Organizations
Grow," Harvard Business Review, July-August 1972, pp. 37-46.
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output of strategy analysis is organizational diagnosis. Some
of the key elements to be considered are:
.size of organization .reporting/measurement process
.organizational structure .reward system
.program structure .communication channels
.formal and informal norms .management style of key actors
.source and locus of power .types of personnel
II.A.5 Strategy Definition
Synthesizing the ideas in the above descriptions of
strategy, we see that a prerequisite to strategic planning is
the compilation of a data base 1) on the opportunities and risks
in the environment of each of the firm's business areas and 2)
on the company's strengths and weaknesses in terms of specific
and hopefully unique skills and resources. This should include
a profile of the formal and informal aspects of the organiza-
tional structure. Corporate goals should be formulated and
expressed in operational terms as objectives. A strategy can
then be formulated as a specific set of action plans and
resource allocations at the corporate and business levels which
modify the firm's participation in its product/market segments
to achieve a fit between the firm's skills, opportunities, and
objectives.
To move this definition out of the normative realm and
into the applied, it must be related more specifically to the
operational realities of corporations. It needs methods or
constructs to depict and compare strategies and processes to
integrate strategy formulation with the points of access to
information and loci of decision making in the firm. The next
section addresses these issues.
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II.B. Constructs for Strategy Formulation
II.B.1 Introduction
There are a few concepts which are the economic frame-
work for most of the corporate strategy methods and models in
widespread use. These will be introduced and described in
this section of the thesis.
The first is the Strategic Business Unit (SBU), which
is the basic unit of analysis for strategy formulation. Roughly
speaking, SBUs are the firm's clusters of product-market
segments related to each other by demand or supply-side factors.
Strategic plans are directed at manipulating SBUs, which may
not strictly correspond to organizational units.
There are three simple models of production and market
growth which are fundamental to the common strategy methods:
.Experience Curve (EC) - the pattern observed in
many firms that product unit costs fall by 15-30%
for every doubling of cumulative production
.Economies of Scale (ES) - decreases in unit costs
due to increasing the scale of production (or
distribution, etc.) to an efficient level
.Product Life Cycle (PLC) - the marketing concept
that the per period dollar volume of industry
sales for a product starts slowly, grows rapidly,
then levels off.
Each of these effects has implications for the performance of
SBUs and for corporate strategic plans. We will examine three
strategy models which rely heavily on these three concepts:
the growth/share portfolio, the market attractiveness business
position profile, and the industry maturity-position portfolio.
For each we will discuss and briefly critique the methods of
determining corporate and business level strategy. Academic
concepts from finance and industrial economics will provide
alternative views of firm valuation and performance.
II.B.2 Strategic Business Units
The business units below the corporate level for which
objectives and strategies must be specified are called strategic
business units (SBUs). SBUs are basically intersections of
products and markets combined (or broken down) such that each is
"the largest monolithic segment that allows for a
proper assessment of internal strengths and
environmental opportunities, and that can be
treated as a separate entity jn terms of the
resource allocation process.
The appropriate definition of SBUs is an extremely important
step in the strategic planning process as all measurements and
recommendations are made with respect to these units. Some
definitions will lead to superior results than others. Un-
fortunately this is one of the less well-developed areas of
the theory, but there are a few guidelines for choosing meaning-
ful SBU boundaries.
Abell and Hammond suggest that SBU definition begins
with the firm's product-market modules described in terms of
three dimensions:8
1) Customer group - who is being served
2) Function - what need is being satisfied
3) Technology - how needs are being satisfied
7Hax, Arnoldo C. and Majluf, N.S., "Toward the Formalization of
Strategic Planning - A Conceptual Framework," Sloan School of
Management Technical Report No. 7, M.I.T., December 1978, p.10.
8Abell, Derek F., and Hammond, John S., Strategic Market Planning,
Problems and Analytical Approaches (Prentice-Hall, Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1979) pp. 391-407.
To some extent, each of these may be independently manipulated.
Hence, it is necessary to make explicit choices on the scope of
participation in each dimension. There may be cost efficiencies
or different internal functional requirements for broad versus
narrow definitions. Obviously the firm must recognize whether
it has the skill and resources to handle a broad definition.
A related issue is the extent to which the SBU will segment and
differentiate its participation under different product-market
definitions. Here the issue is the costs and benefits of
customizing the product, which depend on the determinants of
buyers' behavior and economies of standardization versus penal-
ties or risks from specialization.
,The definition of SBUs should consider both demand and
supply side factors in the firm's markets. Hence shared
functional systems (particularly production, marketing, and
distribution) may suggest using a higher level of aggregation
than the most elementary units. Common costs or common critical
success factors between units may reveal these joint effects.
The availability of information can be a constraint here,
particularly if the prospective SBUs do not correspond to
existing organizational units. This may limit the definition
to units comparable to existing structures, particularly if the
firm is undertaking strategic planning for the first time. On
the other hand, this is not necessarily bad in that it is
necessary and appropriate to recognize the full range of con-
straints imposed by the formal organizational structure or
informal norms and mechanisms of the firm.
Another useful input is the apparent SBU structure
used by competitor firms. While this can only be inferred, it
can identify strategic opportunities if any major portion of
the possible customer x function x technology spectrum is not
being addressed. Whatever SBU structure is chosen, the final
test should be an intuitive check that the proposed units can
be strategically analyzed and autonomously managed.
While the SBU definition may not initially correspond
to existing organizational structures, it is reasonable to
expect that the two should come into line over successive
strategic planning cycles. The conflict between them creates
difficulties in the strategy formulation analysis and the
control of strategic plans after they are put into operation.
However, since organization redesign only occurs discontinuously
at widely spaced intervals, there will always be some gap
between formal structure and the optimum design for the latest
strategy.
II.B.3 Experience Curve
The Experience Curve (EC) is an empirically observed
pattern of unit costs' behavior. For the products of many
manufacturing firms, each firm's product unit costs tend to
fall by a constant percentage with constant percentage increases
in the cumulative number of units produced; 15-30% reductions
for every doubling of cumulative production are commonly cited.
Thus, the logarithm of unit costs is a linearly decreasing
function of the logarithm of cumulative units produced.
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log (Unit
Cost)
Unit
Cost
e Curve
Cumulative Number of log (Cumulative Number
Units Produced of Units Produced)
EC.effects arise from many facets of a firm's production:
there may be a learning curve for labor and management, improved
processes (line balancing), product (and component) standardiza-
tion, or a more efficient input resource mix, and so on. For
a firm to capture its experience curve benefits, it must look
at the cost histories of individual components of products and
at components' current or potential shared experience between
different products. Recognizing such interactions is important
in beginning to identify supply-side factors in defining SBUs.
II.B.4 Economies of Scale
Economies of Scale (ES) are present in the technology of
production if it is possible for the firm to increase its out-
puts with a less than proportional increase in the total cost of
inputs. Clearly this is related to experience curve effects.
However, in common usage the two are separated by restricting the
former to mean benefits from increasing the scale of production.
ES effects may occur for several reasons. There may be
techniques of production which are very efficient but only
.urve
1 .
possible for large scale operations. If a firm's output is
large enough, it can have its staff specialize in particular
tasks to capture learning curves more quickly. There may
also be scale economies arising from the more stable behavior
of a large number of customers; for example, product inventory
may not need to increase proportionally to sales. 9 While many
ES cost reductions come from the scale of production facilities,
they may also arise in marketing, distribution, purchasing, etc.
and in managerial overhead functions like information systems.
II.B.5 Product Life Cycle
The Product Life Cycle (PLC) is another observation
which has a more empirical than theoretical basis. It is the
S-shaped pattern of a product's industry sales per period plotted
against time. Equivalently, sales growth is low when a product
is first introduced, but it climbs rapidly after consumer
acceptance and ultimately levels off to the growth rate of the
economy as a whole (or even declines):
$ Sales
Time Period Product
Life
Cycle
Time
9Mansfield, Edwin, Microeconomics (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., New
York, 1975) pp. 142-143.
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At different stages over a product's life cycle, there will be
different functional requirements or management activities that
are necessary and appropriate for serving the market. Some of
these will be summarized subsequently. One difficulty with the
PLC is that it cannot be readily measured until after the fact.
II.B.6 Integration
The Boston Consulting Group has studied the relation
of price to cost for goods which exhibit EC and PLC effects.
It finds the price often starts below cost but does not decline
as rapidly as cost until the high margins attract competitors.
Their entry causes the price to fall rapidly until appropriate
profits are realized; subsequent margins remain roughly constant
over the, rest of the EC.10 This pattern plus some of the
functional requirements at different stages of the PLC are
11, 12
summarized in Figure 1.
10
Abell, op cit., p. 116
11Hofer, op cit., p. 108
1 2Hax, op cit., p. 38
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II.C. Applied Strategic Planning Techniques
II.C.1 Introduction
There are several strategy formulation methods which
apply these concepts to corporate and business level planning.
The most well-known is the growth share portfolio of the
Boston Consulting Group (BCG); this model relies almost
exclusively on experience curves, economies of scale, and
product life cycles to design strategy. A more general ap-
proach is the market attractiveness-business position portfolio
developed by General Electric and McKinsey & Co. In this
method, EC, ES, and PLC are only one of several inputs to the
planning process. Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL) has a hybrid
method, analyzing corporations in terms of the PLC and general
business position factors.
II.C.2 Growth/Share Portfolio
II.C.2.a Method
The BCG approach to strategic planning begins with the
awareness that the PLC and EC/ES effects are complementary; it
is easiest to double a product's cumulative production in the
early stages of its life cycle. A firm that vigorously invests
in production when a new product is introduced may quickly gain
a cost advantage over competitors and consequently have the
lowest price. As the low price attracts and keeps customers,
the low cost producer gains market share, allowing further
benefits from economies of scale and additional experience curve
efficiencies. The market leader will enjoy the largest volume
and highest profit margin.
BCG has developed a method for integrating and coordi-
nating the attempts of all of a firm's SBUs to exploit market
leadership and experience curve effects. First,the firm should
determine the market growth and relative market share for each
of its SBUs. Market growth rate is a surrogate measure of the
PLC; relative market share (SBU market share/market share of
the largest competitor) is a measure of position on the EC.
All SBUs are then classified as:
Symbol Market Growth Relative Market Share
Cash Cows $ low high
Dogs X low low
Stars * high high
Question Marks ? high low
The corporation as a whole can then be represented as a port-
folio (or menagerie) of these four SBU types.
BCG assumes each type of SBU will have a different
financing need. Cash cows are more than self-sufficient, gener-
ating cash beyond their reinvestment requirements. Dogs will
break even or lose cash, and stars will break even or generate
a small excess. Question marks will need injections of cash
from other sources to finance their growth.
BCG does not distinguish sharply between corporate and
business level objectives. "Every business within a corporation
has a purpose, and that purpose is to generate cash or generate
13
growth." This is in effect a qualitative net present value
(NPV) maximization objective. BCG is more specific in recommend-
ing corporate level strategy. The proposed approach is to
13Zakon, Alan J., "Growth and Financial Strategies," The Boston
Consulting Group, 1971, p. 28.
utilize the SBUs' differing financing needs to integrate their
respective efforts to move down the EC in such a manner that
the performance of the firm as a whole is optimized. This
may require some SBUs to pursue strategies which would be
suboptimal if they were stand-alone businesses; on the other
hand, it allows other SBUs to pursue strategies more ag-
gresively than they otherwise could.
Specifically, the optimal corporate strategy is to use
excess cash from the cash cows to grow the better question
marks into stars. Since the question marks are not their
markets' leaders, this will require rapid investment to in-
crease market share, particularly concentrating on market
segments, which potentially can be dominated. The weaker
question marks should withdraw from their markets or at most
hold share by keeping prices and costs below the market leader.
Stars should strive to move further ahead of their followers
(competitors) by investing in anticipation of future need.
Eventually they will evolve into cash cows. Cash cows in
mature markets should hold their dominant shares and, as mentioned,
spin off cash to question marks. Cows in declining markets
should be "harvested," i.e. tapped for maximum cash flow at the
expense of market share by not reinvesting them in Dogs
should be removed, either through gradual withdrawal or through
divestment.14 The strategic positions and intended movements
of all the firm's SBUs can be visually displayed in a growth/
share portfolio chart. The example in Figure 2 depicts an
14
Abell, op. cit. p. 185
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optimal portfolio of SBUs in that there is a nice balance in
the number and sizes of cash cows, stars, and question marks.
A firm should strive for its stars and good question
marks to grow faster than their markets, dogs and bad question
marks to-grow slower (or not at all), and cash cows to stay
even with their market's growth. If the weighted average of
growth rates for a firm's SBUs is below the firm's "maximum
sustainable growth rate," the firm can achieve higher growth.
The maximum possible rate is calculated assuming no new
equity financing; it is a function of the after tax return or
assets, the after tax cost of debt, the debt/equity ration, and
the earnings (cash) retention rate. The growth performance of
each SBU, should be displayed in a growth/gain matrix. The
matrix in Figure 2 corresponds to the growth/share portfolio;
it depicts SBUs whose growth rates are optimally related to
their markets' growth.
Cash Generation
Relative Market Share
BCG Growth/Share Matrix
( optimal portfolio of SBUs)
O= SBU, area proportional
to sales
* = star ? = question mark
$ = cash X = dog
cow
------- = optimal cash
allocation pattern
----> = optimal
evolution of SBUs
Maximum Sustainable
SBU Growth Rate (%)
BCG Growth/Gain Matrix
( optimal SBU growth rates)
Maximum Sustainable Growth:
D
G (R-i)P + R-PE
D/E = debt/equity
R = after tax return on total
assets
i = interest rate on debt
P = % earnings retained
FIGURE 2
BCG CONSTRUCTS FOR SBU POSITION AND GROWTH ANALYSIS
dP
0
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In summary, the BCG strategy is to have SBUs pursue
market leadership through quickly capturing experience curve
effects at the beginning of each product's life cycle. The
corporate portfolio of SBUs is optimized by funneling cash
from the strong, mature SBUs to those with the greatest PLC/EC
potential, with the objective being to generate cash or .growth.
Corporate strategy strongly determines the objectives of
individual SBUs, but there is little guidance given on how
those SBUs should pursue their targets, i.e. business strategies
are not proposed.
II.C.2.b Critique
The strength of the BCG method is its simplicity and
clarity.. Using the growth/share chart, it is very easy to
interpret and compare the positions of SBUs and to understand
the economic implications of proposed strategies. It is most
applicable to firms in which the production function exhibits
the underlying PLC, EC, and ES effects, such as manufacturers
of commodity-type consumer goods. Even in those environments,
it is imperative that the planner ascertain that the supposed
relationship between market share, market growth and cash flow
is a reality.
On the negative side, it basically recommends only
one kind of strategy, that of standardization and low cost
market leadership. An equally or more attractive strategy
might be to pursue product customization, where features other
than price would be critical to success. Service industries
are in this category. In general, the more intangible the
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product, the less useful is the BCG method of analysis. Another
significant problem is that the model has many assumptions about
capital markets which violate the theories and empirical find-
ings of financial economics. In particular, the ideas of maxi-
mum sustainable growth and benefits of internal financing are
questionable, but a discussion of these problems is beyond the
scope of this study.
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II.C.3 Market Attractiveness/Business Position Profile
II.C.3.a Method
A more general approach to strategy formulation is
to consider market growth and relative share to be only two
of many factors affecting performance, and cash flow or growth
to be only a subset of possible goals for the firm. The
market attractiveness/business position (MA/BP) profiling
method (used by General Electric Corp.) allows managers to
set multiple criteria for assessing the strategic position of
SBUs relative to a multiple objective set.
This method begins with the managers of each SBU
identifying six to eight critical market factors (CMFs) which
are attributes making any market "attractive" for entry by
their business unit. A similar list of six to eight critical
success factors (CSFs) is compiled; these are attributes of the
firm or industry environment which the managers can manipulate
to alter the competition positions of firms in that market.
For both lists, the factors are weighted in terms of relative
importance, the desirable direction of each factor is identified,
and the SBU is rated on each factor for its position relative to
the optimum. That is, the SBU's industry attractiveness is
rated relative to all industries, and the SBU's business
position is rated relative to its competitors in its current
industry. These weights and ratings should be ordinal measures,
although expressed numerically; using cardinal measures would
be extremely difficult and arbitrary. A weighted average of
the ratings on each list is compiled to determine overall
market attractiveness and business position measures. These
should be checked against intuition, as the formality of the
process can distract the user from recognizing that it is
very qualitative.
Ornce the above composite measures of business at-
tractiveness and business position are estimated for each SBU,
the firm's portfolio of businesses can be plotted on a chart
similar to the BCG growth/share chart:
Strong Neutral Weak =
Strong
Market
Attractiveness Neutral
Weak
SBU, area
propor-
tional
to size
of total
market,
shaded
area pro-
portional
to SBU's
market
share
Business Position
To determine a corporate strategy, this profile must be
supplemented by several others. First, each SBU should re-
assess its market attractiveness and business position, this
time projecting its profiles several years ahead (typically
five, or whatever the planning horizon is) under the assump-
tion that the current strategy is continued with no change.
These projected positions should be displayed on an identical
profile chart to make the firm's momentum visually explicit.
(A history of profiles can be developed over several planning
cycles to track the movement of SBUs.) This will reveal
strong and weak expected performances, and the process of
analysis will identify factors (CMFs or CSFs) explicitly
responsible for the change.
Second, an MA/BP profile should be developed for
major competitors. Although doing this is very difficult, it
does make the manager explicitly go through the exercise of
diagnosing his competitor's strategies and positions. Com-
petitor profiles can be compared to the firm's own to identify
opportunities or threats for specific SBUs.
Out of these patterns of expected SBU movements under
the current strategy plus similarities or differences with
respect to competitor profiles, the firm may set a corporate
strategy. Moreover, because SBU-specific information has been
used to analyze the corporate portfolio, it is relatively easy
to move to business strategies from the'SBU objectives set at
the corporate level. The CMF and CSF profiles are the base-
line. These can be extended to identify SBU distinctive
competences or potential competitive advantages by quantifying
the SBU's strengths and weaknesses in its basic resources:
financial, human, organization, physical, and technological.15
Opportunities and threats can be revealed by performing detailed
analyses of the components of market and industry structure,
including suppliers, distributors, etc.
15Hofer, op. cit. p. 145
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II.C.3.b Choosing Critical Factors
A potential problem for this method is that market
attractiveness and business position are very ambiguous con-
cepts, particularly the former. Market attractiveness is
strongly dependent on the relative business position of an
SBU. Unfortunately if this intuitively reasonable concession
is allowed, the variables measured on the axes of the MA/BP
profile chart are not independent or orthogonal. This makes
it very difficult to interpret the economic implications of
SBU movements to new positions on the chart.
There are two approaches to choosing CMFs and CSFs,
neither of which fully alleviates this problem. The first
method is to compile a large list of attributes describing
market and industry structure. Abell suggests numerous factors
measuring aspects of market demand, competition, financial and
economic structure of the industry, technology, and socio-
political considerations.16 For each of these he appraises
the attractiveness of the SBU's market. Then he redesigns the
list such that the same factors are maintained but are described
in terms applicable to a single SBU. (For instance, the market
technological factor "patents and copyrights" becomes "your
patent protection.") For each of these revised factors, the
SBUs position is assessed. The problems of collinearity are
enormous; a market factor will be identified as attractive
largely to the extent that the SBU is in a strong position on
the corresponding success factor. Either list could almost be
used without the other.
The second and recommended method is to try to separate
the CMFs and CSFs as much as possible. CMFs should include
only those market factors which are critical to any firm in
the industry and are similarly valued for all such firms.
(These may be factors noncontrollable by the individual firms.)
A good place to start looking for a list of such factors is
the structure-conduct-performance framework of analysis used
in industrial economics. This includes:
. minimum efficient scale . produces concentration
. cost fixity . buyer and supplier
concentration
. vertical and horizontal . demand growth
integration
. regulatory constraints . demand elasticity
barriers to entry . product differentiation
• strategic groups/mobility
In general, determinants of rivalry among firms should also be
included. Porter has done an excellent job of cataloguing
these.1 7
With CMFs defined as above, CSFs should be chosen
from factors on which the SBU is different from most firms in
the industry and which are to some extent controllable by the
individual firm. This list can be drawn from particular
functional skills and resources held by the firm. With that,
one achieves as much independence as possible.
17Porter, Michael, "Note on the Structural Analysis of
Industries," Harvard Business School Note 9-376-054,
November 1977.
II.C.3.c Critique
On paper, this is a very appealing and apparently
powerful method, and indeed it has many attractive features.
One is the flexibility and generality of accommodating multi-
dimensional objectives and measures of performance. This
makes it suitable for many more diverse industries than the
BCG framework, with a good chance that it will have greater
explanatory power in each. Much more important than this
is that it is a very instructive and thought provoking process
in which the managers themselves participate quite extensively.
It forces them to identify the key factors in their SBU's
performance and to assess these horizontally with respect to
competitors and longitudinally with respect to themselves over
time, including projections into the future. This is an
extremely valuable exercise even if it does not directly identify
an optimal strategic plan.
Another significant benefit is that the process of
strategy formulation at the corporate level leads neatly into
implementation at the business level. First, there is a
relatively easy conversion of SBU objectives into SBU strategy,
and then there is an easy transition to implementation and
control (compared to the transitions from other models). This
ease arises because the corporate strategy formulation process
identifies those CSFs which will move or should move, as well
as how to measure (monitor) them. (We use this portfolio
method in the case study.)
However, its weaknesses are also nontrivial. The
foremost problem is the ambiguity in defining market attractive-
ness and business position as already discussed. Another
problem in choosing CMFs and CSFs is the need to have the
critical factors be uncorrelated among themselves within the
CMF and CSF sets. If several of the CSFs have cause and effect
relationships, there will be double counting of certain attri-
butes in the composite assessments. In principle, this could
be avoided by using multiple regression techniques to identify
and weight critical factors.
The final problem of using composite MA/BP measures
for different SBUs is that displaying them all on a common
profile chart creates a false sense of comparability. In fact,
since each SBU has a different set of CMFs and CSFs (only
the composite measures have the same dimension), their relative
positions are not comparable in the sense that they are for
a BCG growth/share portfolio. That is, the economic basis
for the difference in position is not revealed. Moreover, if
an SBU moves to a new position or tries to assess how it would
be positioned in a new market, its set of critical factors
changes. Because of the complexity of the MA/BP profiling
process, this can be a constraint on considering alternative
strategies.
To some extent, these criticisms are more academic than
operational. The user of this model does need to be extremely
careful to be a systematic and rigorous as possible. He will
not overcome these problems, but neither will they cripple his
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analysis. Strategy formulation is more of an art than a science,
and the MA/BP profiling method is a useful concept of sparking
creative thinking.
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II.C.4 Industry Maturity - Position Portfolio
A third construct for strategic planning is that used
by Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL). It is a hybrid method much
like the MA/BP profile except that market attractiveness is
replaced by industry maturity, i.e. the PLC. Business position
is determined as a weighted average of critical factors,, as
before. Corporate strategy is set much as in the MA/BP case,
but with an added awareness of suggested objectives for SBUs
based on their position.1 8
Product Life Cycle
Development
strong
average
weak
dropout?
Strategies Based on Business Position and Industry Maturity
1 8Hofer, op. cit. p. 104.
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Business strategies follow in part from the CSFs used to esti-
mate position, plus there are many guidelines for managerial
emphasis on different activities at different life cycle stages
(see Figure 1.) This method basically offers no new academic
insights, but it may be more appropriate than either the BCG
or the MA/BP approach under certain circumstances. By using
the PLC instead of market attractiveness, the ADL approach
avoids much of the problem of having non-orthogonal axes.
II.D. Strategy Formulation Process Model
We have proposed a definition of strategy and have re-
viewed three methods of systematically collecting strategic
information, assessing the current strategic position of SBUs
and developing strategic plans which optimize the performance
of the corporate portfolio of businesses. The flow chart in
Figure 3 represents one method of organizing the inputs and
outputs of those strategic planning tools in a manner which
links the corporate and business level objectives and strategies.
This is a model of the analytic process of strategy formulation;
it is not a model of a strategic planning system relating flows
of information to organizational structure. We will discuss
the decisions or information processing at each major node of
the process, indicated by the numerals 1 through 8.
(1 Corporate Goals
Corporate
Objectives
( SBU Definition
SBU Threats
and Opportunities
® SBU Profiles,
Current and Projected SBU Skills
esources
\ Corporate Portfolio,
Current and Projected
S)Corporate Gap AnalysI
Option Identificatior
Acquisitions, Tentative SBU
Divestitures Objectives
) Revised Corporate Portfolio
Gap Analysis
SFinal Corporate and SBU
Objectives and Strategies
Figure 3
SBU Gap __ SBU
Analysis Strategy
Projected SBU
Profile
A MODEL OF THE ANALYTIC PROCESS OF STRATEGY FORMULATION
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1. Initial corporate goals and objectives are established.
These will reflect the preferences for profit, risk, growth,
and social responsibilities of all parties to whom the firm
has responsibility, with strong priority given to share-
holders.
2. Strategic Business Units are defined in terms of the scope
and manner of participation in customer x function x tech-
nology product-market segments. The selected structure
should be amenable to strategic analysis and manipulation.
3. The current strategic position of each SBU is determined.
This initial assessment considers environmental threats
or opportunities and SBU resources and skills in a general
manner, i.e. not in the total possible detail. CMFs and
CSFs or PLC-EC measures may be used as appropriate for the
firm's economics. The future profile of each SBU is also
compiled based on the supposition that the firm's current
strategy is maintained over the planning horizon.
4. The firm's portfolio of current and projected SBUs is com-
pared to corporate objectives and gaps are analyzed. Gaps
may arise from:
-poor portfolio balance - too many dogs and question marks
*SBUs performing more poorly than would be expected based
on their strategic position
-special opportunities or threats inferred from comparison
with competitors
-resource availability not equaling needs
Gap closing alternatives are identified; these will specify
tentative SBU objectives.
5. After SBU profiles have been compared to the tentative SBU
objectives, the SBU fromulates its own strategy to close
gaps. This requires a more detailed examination of the
SBU's resources and opportunities than was conducted in
step 3. The result of the SBU strategy analysis is:
*an approval of the SBU's tentative objectives or a pro-
posal for an alternative objectives set
-tentative resource utilization plans
*tentative functional strategies
6. Gap closing alternatives may include acquisition or divest-
ment.
7. The corporate portfolio is reviewed after proposed revisions
in objectives from the SBUs. If it is determined there are
no gaps, the flow drops down to 8) formalization. If there
are gaps, the process iterates back to 4), option identifi-
cation. It is possible to revise corporate objectives as
one gap-closing option.
8. After sufficient iterations, agreement is reached on corpo-
rate and SBU goals, objectives, and strategies. Any or all
of the following are specified:
-resource allocations or procurement plans
-budgets and control mechanisms
-contingency plans-
-changes in organizational structure
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This captures all of the strategic intelligence data re-
quired by the definition of strategy and is viable for use with
any of the specific tools of analysis presented in this thesis.
45
III. INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY
The strategy formulation model (hereafter referred to
as the G/W model) described in Section II.D. is applied to the
strategic planning process of a consulting firm. The market
attractiveness/business position profile serves as the main
diagnostic tool throughout the planning process. SBU managers
choose the critical factors for both dimensions. Interviews
with clients and competitors serve as a check to balance any
subjective biases introduced by SBU manager business position
assessments.
The case study begins with a chapter devoted to provid-
ing background industry and company information to the reader.
Although not directly involved in the formal strategic analysis,
this chapter supplies the reference basis which shaped our ques-
tions and method of analysis. Chapter V defines the business
units which are studied for the remainder of the report.
Salient business dimensions are tested for manageability, or-
ganizational structure constraints, and strategic meaning to
determine strategic business units. SBUs are profiled for
business position and market attractiveness according to a four
part process in Chapter VI. The analysis is based on informa-
tion from four sources: SBU manager interviews, industry sales
histories, client interviews, and competitor interviews. Each
of the last three sets adds a refinement to the initial profile
obtained from interviews with SBU managers.
Chapter VII concludes the case study with gap analysis
and option identification. The current strategic positions of
each SBU are projected over a meaningful planning horizon. A
broad and qualitative set of apparent goals for the firm is
postulated. Four strategic options are outlined in operational
detail which attempt to move the company close to our estimate
of corporate goals. Tradeoffs between the alternatives, such
as risk and expected time to achievement, are addressed but not
resolved; goals and objectives need to be refined in order
to be confident of how to choose among them. Nonetheless,
without this refinement we make a cautious recommendation that
Econology pursue a market planning/research strategy. In
addition, general recommendations on operational and organizational
effectiveness are provided which are applicable under any
strategic choice. The case concludes with suggestions for
further strategic planning by Econology. Our strategic
analysis carries us only through step four, corporate gap
analysis and option identification, in the G/W model, the sub-
sequent steps should be performed by the company to modify and
refine this strategic analysis.
The name of the consulting firm is changed to protect
its identity. Certain descriptive statistics are also altered
in cases where the logic of our analysis would not be disturbed
by the change. In addition, specific information sources are
not identified to protect the candid and unbiased responses
of interviewees.
IV. GENERAL INFORMATION ON FIRM AND ENVIRONMENT
IV.A. Overview of Econology
IV.A.1 History
Econology (E) was founded in 1956 by its current execu-
tive officers. The original orientation was to provide con-
sulting services on the effects of changing technology in in-
dustrial markets. Since then the firm has switched its focus
from changing technologies to general market research and
analysis for industrial firms. Except for a no-growth period
in the 1975 recession, E has experienced 20-30% nominal annual
growth in fee revenues since 1970, with fee revenues in fiscal
year 1979 at $8.4 million. (Services are provided on a fee
plus out of pocket (OoP) expenses basis; the above figures
do not include revenues accrued to cover OoP expenses.)
E now has 112 professionals nearly all of whom are
based in the headquarters office in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
All but a very few have an undergraduate degree in engineer-
ing plus an MBA degree, usually obtained from a midwestern
university. The company has a set of international affiliates
which are managed by a few members of the domestic professional
staff.
IV.A.2 Description of Services
Within all industry areas, repeat business (by firm)
constitutes from 60-80% of revenues. All industry areas pro-
vide essentially two kinds of services:
Proprietary - Conducted for a single client, these are usually
market penetration studies of how a client's
new product can enter a market or how an old
product can enter a new market, although studies
range from basic market profiles to acquisition
analyses. Typically the market and the problem
to be investigated are both specified by the
client.
A proprietary study requires one to six man
months of effort, averaging perhaps two to
three man months, and it will cost the client
from $5000 to $25000. An international study
is often more expensive.
Multiclient - Conducted for several clients, these are studies
of broad issues affecting all firms in a par-
ticular market giving a profile of levels and
changes in the supply and demand for a product,
its production technology, etc.
A multiclient study may require up to nine man
months; it will be available to clients for
$8000 to $15000.
For all of these studies in all industries the E research and
client interaction methodology are essentially the same,
although the scope of the studies may vary. Each study begins
with a short meeting with the client to bring all parties' per-
ception of the problem into harmony and to conduct a brief re-
view of the internal capabilities and structure of the client.
The E consultants begin the research with a review of any
secondary (i.e. public) information on the problem. This is
followed by many face to face interviews with the client's
suppliers, distributors, customers, and competitors in which
the perceptions of all parties acting on the client are polled
and aggregated into a picture of the market opportunity. At
the midpoint of the contract there is a meeting with the client
to discuss the evolving picture and to modify the direction of
the remainder of the study if necessary. The last 10-20% of
the contract period is spent in analysis of the data and in
writing up the document summarizing the information and giving
an interpretation. The analysis lies in appropriate segmen-
tation and representation of the market based on the collected
data. Little complex modelling or mathematical analysis of
the data is attempted. The contract is closed with a one day
verbal presentation of the study to the client. Because the
method is so standardized and homogeneously carried out through-
out the firm, it is reasonably accurate to consider costs a
fixed percentage of fee revenues. (The control and compensa-
tion system are discussed in more detail later.)
The multiclient studies serve as major marketing
devices for E in that they are a good method of exposing a
client to-E's services at little cost to him. They are also
countercyclical, either due to the price or because E promotes
them more heavily when the economy slows down. The following
graph (Figure 4) shows the recent fee revenues for the firm as
a whole plus its multiclient and proprietary domestic components
and international components. The countercyclicality of the
multiclients is fairly striking.
Fee
Revenues
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(domestic)
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1971 '72 '73 '74 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79
FIGURE 4
TEN YEAR FEE REVENUE HISTORY FOR ECONOLOGY
IV.A.3 Client Base
The client is generally a senior middle manager or
staff member in a Fortune 500 firm. Representative levels of
contact with the client firm would be the divisional manager
or the divisional or corporate V.P. of marketing, corporate
development, or R & D.
IV.A.4 Organization
Econology is privately held with a majority of the
firm owned by the President and the Chairman of the Board
(CoB), and the residual held primarily by a few principals.
The President, CoB, Executive Vice President, and Vice
President serve in three capacities: administrators, line
officers, and active principals (consultants). There are
twenty-two principals each concentrating on one or more
industry areas. Each principal manages $150,000 to $600,000
of business annually (including revenues for OoP expenses)
and has a staff of three to seven professionals. The officers
and two principals serve on the executive committee (E/C) which
controls all major firm policy.
An organizational structure diagram is shown in Figure
5, followed by a description of the levels of responsibility in
the personnel hierarchy in Figure 6.
In practice the duties and responsibilities are not
so finely delineated as specified in Figure 6. The responsi-
bilities outlined should be used more as guidelines and
examples of commonly performed work.
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Staff promotion through the organization hierarchy
is not based on a standardized and regular schedule. For
example, advancement from consultant to senior associate may
take anywhere from 4 to 6 years. Econology has a staff turn-
over averaging 10% annually. This figure is within the range
of many consulting firms, although several experience much
higher rates.
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Approxi-
mate
Number of
Staff Title Position Description
Principal
Associate'
(management
level)
Senior
Associate
(top con-
sulting
level)
Associate
(experienced
consultant)
Management Responsibilities
-recruiting new staff
-evaluation of business directions
-staff performance reviews
-ancillary management functions
Primary Professional Responsibilities
-minimum level of annual sales
-active promotional contact: clients/
prospective clients
-supervise project quality
Secondary Professional Responsibilites
-aid professional development
.-increase E's public exposure
Primary Responsibilities
-manage and control conduct of
assigned projects
-assist in development of assigned
staff in methodology, questionnaire,
design, and interviewing
-minimum level of annual sales
Secondary Responsibilities
-outline promotional activites
-secondary liaison with client
Reports to Principal
Primary Responsibilities
-supervise study under the control of
principal or senior associate
-conduct field work
-draft interviews
-oral client presentations
Secondary Responsibilities
-assist in proposal preparation
-be aware of promotional opportunities
Report to principal or senior associate
FIGURE 6
LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PERSONNEL HIERARCHY
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Approxi
mate
Number of
Staff Title Position Description
18 Senior
Consultant
(reasonably
experienced
consultant)
Consultant
(inexperi-
enced)
Senior
Research
Ass't and
Research
AssI't
(professional
staff)
Administrative/
Support Staff
FIGURE 6 (continued)
LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE PERSONNEL HIERARCHY
Primary Responsibilities
-prepare questionnaires and inter-
view guides
-plan own interview schedule
-conduct field and telephone
interviews
-deliver oral presentation
Secondary Responsibilities
-assist in development of study
program
-assist in proposal writing
Report to principal, senior associate
or associate
Responsibilities
-prepare interview guides
-interpret interview results
-draft reports and presentations
-recognize elements of program
budgets
Reports to principal, senior associate,
or associate
Responsibilities
-support staff
-literature search
-statistical data
-telephone interviews
-selected personal interviews
Reports to principal, senior associate,
or associate
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IV.B. Overview of Industry
IV.B.1 Introduction
The consulting industry is discussed at three levels,
1) overview of the entire industry, 2) distinguishing features
of the market research industry, and 3) characteristics of
the industrial market research industry. The majority of
Econology's businesses operate within the industrial market
research/planning industry, which is well described by the
industrial market research industry. Econology differs only
in its heavier than usual emphasis on analysis.
IV.B.2 The Management Consulting Industry
There is no tight definition of what constitutes
management consulting. Roughly it could be described as giving
expert advice as a professional in areas of business or organ-
izational management. These areas may be segmented by industry,
such as steel, utilities, and electronics, or by function, such
as marketing, finance, and operations research.
Although accurate statistics are difficult to acquire
because most firms are privately owned, estimated total revenues
are around $2 billion for 1979 and have been growing at roughly
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15 to 20% since 1979. Strategic planning and consulting has
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Kennedy, James H., A Cross-Section of the Management Consult-
ing Business (Fitzwilliam, N.H., Consultants News, 1979.)
contributed to much of this growth, for example the Boston Con-
sulting Group (strategy consultants) have experienced 558%
growth since 1971 - 55% within the last year. However, stra-
tegic planning is not the only growth area. Rapid growth has
occurred and is forecasted in many specialty areas, such as
in information systems, energy issues, and environmental issues.
James Farley, Chairman of Booz, Allen, & Hamilton believes
specialization (or issue orientation) is crucial for future
success in consulting, "No consultant will be here five years
from now who doesn't understand that issue orientation is the
way to go".20
This spectacular growth, especially compared to the
'50s or '60s, is attributed to a new complex operating environ-
ment. Firms today are faced with added Federal regulations,
attractive foreign markets, and inflation. To help attack
these complexities management techniques have evolved rapidly,
introducing sophisticated information processing, economic
analysis, and quantitative modelling to the consultant's tool
kit. Complicated tools, as well as unstructured growth, have
caused many consulting firms to seek only professionals with
graduate business school training. Competitive bidding for
graduates of the top business schools has driven up starting
salaries, now ranging from $20,000 to $75,000. MBAs going
into consulting from MIT's Sloan School of Management are
20
"The New Shape of Management Consulting," Business Week,
May 21, 1979, p. 98.
receiving average salary offers of $33,900; MBAs from other
prestigious schools receive comparable offers.21
Although there are a multitude of consultants (esti-
mated from 25,000 to 50,000), the revenues of the industry are
concentrated within a few firms. The top 15 firms (composed
of 13,000 professionals) account for over one-half the industry
revenues. As the chart below shows, only 118 firms bill over
$1 million.2 2
FIRM REVENUE CATEGORIES
Total Revenues
Revenue Bracket Number of Firms (millions)
under $100,000 128 | $ 6.4
$100 - 500,000 239 1 $ 59.75
$500,000, -
1 million 81 $ 52.65
$1 - 5 million 74 $ 185.0
$5 - 10 million 14 1 $ 91.0
over $10 million 30 ) $ 1383.0
Total 583 $ 1777.8
The remaining 2000 (estimated) firms share a market of $.2 billion.
Consulting firms are similar in that they strive to
improve management and analyze business problems. Most also have
an organizational structure with Principals or Partners at the
top, Associates and Consultants at the bottom, and Senior
21
M.I.T. Sloan School of Management Placement Report, 1979
22Kennedy, James H., op. cit.
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Associates (or Senior Consultants) at the middle management
levels. Annual turnover in these organizations is highly
variable ranging from 25% for BCG to 5% for Hewitt Associates.
F.irms vary considerably in size, location, type of
work, methodologies, atmosphere, and personal style. One
possible categorization places consulting firms into four
groups: 1) large general management firms offering a vast
variety of services (e.g. McKinsey; Booz, Allen, Hamilton;
Arthur D. Little; A.T. Kearney; 2) medium and small firms
specializing in one or several facets of management
(Technomic Consultants; Temple, Barker & Sloane; Hewitt
Associates; Resource Planning Associates; Index Systems);
3) Highly technical and quantitative firms (e.g. Wharton Econo-
metrics; Data Resources, Inc.); and 4) management advisory
services of the Big Eight accounting firms, whose intimate
knowledge of SEC rulings and accounting has allowed them to
specialize in government reulation compliance, information
systems, and control consulting.
IV.B.4 The Market Research Industry
Marketing Research is the systematic gathering, record-
ing, and analyzing of information about problems and opportunities
relating to the marketing of goods and services. In 1974 over
$380 million was spent on marketing research;2 3 assuming a 15%
growth rate this market grew to over $700 million by 1979.
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Haynes, Joel B. and Wilkens, Paul L., "The Pricing of Marketing
Research Services", Business Horizons, October 1974.
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Roughly 22% of consulting firms identified themselves as offer-
ing services in this marketing area.24
The competitive environment is determined by three basic
elements. First is the number of firms in competition. Most
marketing research firms face only one or two competitors for
a project. This is due to the preference of research buyers
to work with one supplier, the refusal of some research firms
to bid competitively, research firm specialization, and geogra-
phical dispersion.
The second element is the size of firms in competition.
Generally competing firms are of the same size; this is because
specialists tend to compete with specialists and generalists
with generalists. The specialists are larger firms who conduct
standardized studies (store audits, copy tests, audience
measurements) and for that reason tend to compete on the basis
of price with sales and production orientations. The gener-
alists are smaller firms who handle any type of research pro-
blem (custom designed studies) and are more price insensitive
with a profit orientation.
The third element is the degree of service differentia-
tion. Research firms differ greatly in experience, competence,
and fields of specialization. A vaguely defined problem may
easily find bids recommending use of sophisticated research
equipment and methodologies with small samples for $3,000
ranging up to comprehensive interview with large samples for
24
Kennedy, James H., op. cit.
$13,000. Another source of differentiation may be psychologi-
cal differences based on firm reputation.
Twelve factors thought to be important in obtaining
business were ranked by research firms in a 1974 study by Haynes
and Wilkens.2 5
RANK
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
FACTOR
Quality of work
Understanding the client's problems
Reputation
Professional integrity
Experience
Referral by satisfied clients
Personalty of key personnel
Individuals who will work on project
Firm specialization
Personal contact (solicitation)
Price
Advertising
Price is of relatively low importance; the study sug-
gested that clients consider price only if it exceeds a certain
ceiling price. Price may also be used as a proxy for quality,
especially when the buyer is inexperienced or the study complex.
For this reason, the more profitable firms used a simple formula
(e.g. (per hour rate x time) + out-of-pocket expenses) to get
a ball park target margin and then subjectively adjusted this
2 5
Haynes, Joel B. and Wilkens, Paul L., op. cit.
price considering job size, value of project to client, client's
ability to pay, possible competition, present work load, and
urgency of job to maximize profit.
IV.B.4 The Industrial Market Research Industry
Marketing research can be subdivided into consumer and
industrial goods marketing research. Although the dollar volume
of transactions in industrial goods and services is twice that
of consumer goods and services, marketing research expenditures
are dominated by consumer research. This may be due to the
availability of consumer information, gross margin or value-
added differences (enabling consumer goods firms to spend more
for market research), closer relationships between industrial
buyers and sellers eliminating the perceived need for much
market research, or the relatively advanced state-of-the-art
for consumer research relative to industrial market research.
Other factors have been proposed to explain the rela-
tive lack of industrial marketing research. Wilson26 concluded
in 1969 that Great Britain was ahead of the rest of the world
in industrial market research. He attributed this development
to Britain's lack of adequate secondary data. The US abundance
of reliable secondary data may have stifled industrial research
growth in the 1960s was a result of the new emphasis on long
range planning and its information demands.
26Wilson, Aubrey, "Industrial Marketing Research in Britain,"
Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 6, February 1969,
pp. 15-27.
Differences between industrial and consumer goods markets
lead to differences in the research markets. There are three
important differences. First, the demand for industrial goods
are derived from demand for related consumer goods. The
longer the chain of demand, the more likely industrial goods
demand will be on a "boom - bust" cycle, stemming from changes
in inventories and expectations. Demand for market research
may be determined more by budget than need and thus ride the
same volatile cycle.
Second, industrial markets are marked by geographic,
industrial, and purchasing .concentration. Industrial concentra-
tion results from the very nature of industrial goods to serve
limited markets. Purchasing concentration is created by having
only a few firms account for many of the sales. Concentra-
tion in goods markets concentrates marketing research around
only a few clients, goods, or geographical regions.
Third, more individuals and purchasing procedures are
involved in an industrial purchasing decision. Individuals
are economically oriented and knowledgeable about the product.
Generally the relationship between the buyer and seller is close,
strong, and continuous. How adequate one considers existing
channels of communications to be is directly related to the
amount of marketing research effort.
Industrial market research/consulting firms compete
with corporate market research departments, as well as with
other consulting firms. In fact, 75% of all industrial goods
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firms with sales over $100 million have their own market re-
search departments. Nonetheless, larger industrial firms
demonstrated a strong tendency to purchase outside research
services. In 1973 about 25% of the marketing research budget
was allocated to outside firms.
Expenditures for industrial marketing research as a
percentage of sales decline as annual sales increase, with a
27
median figure of 0.1% for all companies. This pattern is
shown below:
.60
.50
median
expenditures
for
industrial .40
market
research
as
a .30
percentage
of
sales
.20
.10
under $5- $26- $51- $101- $201- over
$5 $25 $50 $100 $200 $500 $500
annual sales (millions)
271973 Survey of Marketing Research. (American Marketing
Association, Chicaqo 1973T.
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IV.B.5 Summary
This chapter provided a brief overview of the consulting
industry and marketing in particular. Certain aspects'of this
description are very relevant to Econology and are explored in
this study:
- Strategy consulting is a profitable and rapidly
growing field attracting consultants who already
possess one or more of the necessary skills.
- Specialization and focus are essential to con-
sulting firms. In fact, this may be a crucial
factor for service firms in general.
- The professional atmosphere of a consulting firm
makes organizational and personnel issues very
important, as suggested by high staff turnover
rates.
- The general factors important to market research
buyers may or may not hold for a specific con-
sulting firm. (These general factors are later
used in client interview to explore the particular
buying behavior of Econology clients.)
- Promotion is critical in industrial marketing, where
perceived needs are reduced due to the intimacy of
industrial product buyers and sellers.
- Average ratios of marketing research expenditures
versus industry sales may be used to estimate
market share. Later in our analysis industry sales
are used to project future firm growth.
V. DEFINING THE BUSINESS
V.A. Basic Dimensions of Business
V.A.1 Methodology
Establishing strategic business units (SBUs) with an
appropriate level of aggregation of Econology's product-
market segment is a fundamental precursor to strategy formu-
lation. As described in Section II.B.2, some SBU definitions
will be superior to others. To determine the most meaningful
SBUs, we began by interviewing each principal about the three
basic dimensions of the business he was responsible for --
customer groups, function (i.e. what needs do they satisfy in
the market place), and technology (i.e. methodology and skills
used to serve clients). Within these basic dimensions there
are subdimensions which may discriminate between SBUs:
Customer Function Technology
industry purpose of study research method
subindustry circumstances sources of data
contact with client requiring study expertise required
firm scale of stucy
type of study
new or repeat customer
geographic locations
Obviously many of these are interdependent, but they are
also not perfectly correlated. To probe which of these attri-
butes were significant, the following questions in Figure 7 were
used as an interview framework. The questions were arranged
around the above three dimensions and a general category. The
general category questions are directed at confirming or refuting
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the appropriateness of the SBU definition derived from the
customer-function-technology questions.
Customer:
Function:
Technology:
What is the client industry, type, size of firm?
What is served market segment?
Who is the client firm; who is the contact?
Where are they located?
What is the client's purpose for the study?
- to confirm a problem or possibility
- find new options or choose among known
alternatives
- define a marketing strategy, set prices
How is the study used and by whom?
What size is the contract - time and staff and
money?
How distinct is each study - could it be done
by a person from another industry group?
How important is industry or functional expertise?
Are there special analytic techniques required?
What is the product unit of service?
Are there any experience curve effects or
economies of scale?
What kinds of cost structure differences are
there between studies within or across
industries?
General
Category:
What are the reasons for or against taking the
industry practice areas as SBUs?
Are there common client contacts between
principals?
What functions at Econology allow you to take
advantage of these?
Critical success factors for the tentative SBUs?
Who are your closest competitors and how do you
encounter them in the market?
Can the proposed SBUs be independently expanded,
contracted, and managed without signifi-
cantly affecting each others' operation?
FIGURE 7
SBU QUESTIONNAIRE
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We find that those attributes related to the customer
group dimension delineated the E services most effectively.
The function and technology dimensions are essentially the
same for all of E's business areas; when there are distinct
business modules by those dimensions, they are the same as
those defined by customer group attributes.
Each dimension is discussed separately below. On
certain subdimensions the business area of international
marketing differs from the industrial marketing areas.
Recently Econology has started consulting in the financial
services industry. This group is attempting to break into
strategic planning for financial institutions. It is in
its formative stages so no general statements can be made
concerning typical clients, function, or technology. However,
their targets in each of these dimensions will be mentioned
and business will be segmented on this basis.
V.A.2 The Customer Dimension
Generally all of the principals conduct market/product
studies for corporate development or marketing managers of
divisions of major Fortune 500 firms. The scope of these
studies is quite uniform across all principals, involving
essentially only market analysis of a situation specified by
the client. Occasionally E works for the CEO of the client
firm, which might be a basis for defining an SBU if there were
enough such contracts; the number is too small to justify the
division.
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In contrast, the clients for the international market-
ing business area are divisions of American-based multinational
corporations (MNCs) with business in Europe, Japan, Australia,
the Middle East, and Latin America. Contact with the client
is typically with the country or area (e.g., Latin America)
manager. The industry of the MNC division seeking a study
is not a relevant factor, however, the region in which the
division operates is relevant.
The financial services group intends to serve top execu-
tive officers and planners of regional financial institutions.
These corporations would include savings and loans, commercial
banks, and credit unions of medium size, not including Fortune
500 or money center institutions.
Repeat business is difficult to quantify, as two con-
tracts with a large firm may have a large span of time between
them and the points of contact with the client firm may be
different departments and/or different people for the two
studies. When should a subsequent study be considered "repeat
business"? There is no general agreement or accounting
practice for this at E, so these statistics reflect the judge-
ment of the individual principals. Generally, business is
repeat if it is with the same department with less than three
years elapsed since its predecessor.
V.A.3 The Function Dimension
The circumstances motivating the client to use E for a
study are also quite similar across all principals: the client
has a staff shortage, needs an internal conflict resolved, is
not capable of conducting such a study itself, etc. If there
were consistent patterns associated with groups of clients,
e.g., a group with very lean internal staff requiring fre-
quent outside consulting versus a group of those incapable
of conducting an E study due to competitive position (or lack
of knowledge of how to do so)., this would probably merit being
a basis for an SBU segmentation. Conceivably the groups might
be approached with different marketing tactics, prices, or
even methodologies. Unfortunately, the information about how
to segment clients into such groups was not available (and
there may not be such consistent patterns at all).
Like domestic industry studies, 99% of the work in the
International area is market entry studies with the potential
entry by exporting, direct foreign investment, acquisition,
joint venture, or licensing. It is very rare for E to get a
worldwide study which includes the US market. Occasionally
they conduct a one-country study on several products, but more
commonly the work is a one-product study for several countries.
The financial services strategic planning group attacks
problems which are less pre-defined than those done by other
SBUs; the emphasis of financial services is helping clients
adapt to a changing environment. Financial institutions are
believed to be entering a particularly arduous period of new
regulatory and competitive pressures. The group intends to
bring a marketing, rather than financial, expertise to stra-
tegic planning. Whether financial markets bear enough
resemblence to real product markets that a traditional product-
market analysis of demands and supply is appropriate and
valuable has yet to be tested in the market place.
V.A.4 The Technology Dimension
With respect to the technology behind the E product,
studies for all industries and principal business areas
(including International) are conducted in the same general
manner. The basic tool is field interviews with the client's
suppliers, distributors, customers, and competitors, with
analysis arising in the appropriate use of that information
to segment and understand the market for the client's product.
There are three aspects of this methodology which differ
between some principals:
-some of the clients have markets heavily affected
by consumers (rather than firms), making it
necessary to include statistical consumer market
research in the E studies. This is usually sub-
contracted
-some of the clients have heavily concentrated
industries in their suppliers and buyers, requir-
ing fewer interviews per study than a client
dealing with numerous firms
-large studies may require less managerial time by
the principal per dollar of revenues, creating a
kind of economy of scale. This is particularly
exemplified by international studies.
Even when these differences are fairly stable, either they are
also captured by segmentation by industry or there is little
strategic significance to disaggregating that finely.
For the industry marketing business areas industry exper-
tise is obviously correlated with customer group, hence adds
no refinement to a SBU definition. Moreover, for those
industries with little technology focus it may only require
a year for staff to acquire sufficient experience to be comfort-
able and effective in the industry area, i.e. industry expertise
is not constraining in the long run. However, there is rela-
tively little rotation of staff between areas, making this
distinction stronger than it need be.
An international study is conducted like a domestic one,
but it is more complicated. Wholly owned affiliates of foreign
consulting firms having exclusive agreements with E are the
primary vehicle for conducting the studies. The E principals
do essentially all of the marketing, as well as writing of the
proposals and designing the research process. The affiliates
perform the information gathering, identifying and meeting with
the interviewees. The E principals then do the analysis,
interpretation, recommendations, etc. and write the reports.
Quality control problem and lack of sophistication in the
affiliates necessitates this approach.
In some cases, a U.S. E principal other than those
in international consulting will work on the international pro-
jects; this is especially true when domestic industry expertise
is important. International studies do not encompass any
broader range of functional expertise (e.g., finance, planning)
than domestic ones. International projects are larger and more
costly than their U.S. counterparts because it takes more
effort to accumulate the equivalent amount of information due
to segmentation of cultures, markets, and business norms plus
transportational and communicational difficulties.
International marketing studies cover many industry
areas; in this sense the consultants in this area are con-
sidered generalists. Their expertise is based on under-
standing a geographic region and its culture, rather than on
specific industry knowledge.
Financial Services will rely much more on public infor-
mation than the rest of Econology, which prides itself in
gathering primary data. A knowledge of industry specifics
coupled with a working understanding of strategic planning
tools (e.g. growth-share matrix, product life cycle, and
economies of scale) are the essential skills used to perform
client studies.
75
V.B. Salient Subdimensions
V.B.1 Potential Segmentation Criteria
A table summarizing the salient differences in E's
business areas is shown in Figure 8. The columns represent sub-
dimensions from which SBUs can be constructed. All of the
dimensions except industry (the first two columns) are in-
appropriate to consider as SBU separation criteria. One
problem common to all dimensions but industry is lack of account-
ing data, There is very little accounting data available to
evaluate the past performance of business units broken down
along these lines. This problem will be discussed first, followed
by rationales for segmenting or not segmenting along certain
subdimensions.
V.B.2 Lack of Accounting Data
The lack of accounting data means it is difficult to
study the differences, if any, in the economic behaviour of
business units. Generally accounting records are by principal,
and when there are two principals dividing responsibility for
an area along subsidiary lines, it is potentially meaningful to
use the finer SBU breakdown. For those industries where this is
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a possibility, it is not clear to us that there is any advantage
in considering the areas to be two SBUs each. However, some
principals commented that the critical success factors for their
subsidiaries do differ somewhat. As these sub-areas grow in
size, they may well become SBUs for future strategic planning.
V.B.3 Study Type
This attribute has some potential as a basis for SBU
segmentation as the size of the firm increases. More detailed
accounting data than is currently available could reveal whether
there are significant economic and functional differences between
study types to justify using them for segmentation. Multiclient
studies serve three purposes not duplicated by the other study
types: they are a countercyclicality buffer when recessions
hit the proprietary business, they are a useful training tool
for consultants new to an industry, and they are a marketing
device for developing future proprietary business. Hence, it
is conceivable that they could be a target for special managerial
attention within an industry area.
However, the study-type dimension was not chosen for
SBU segmentation because of joint production reasons. Proprietary,
multiclient, and planning program studies all use basically the
same marketing, analysis skills, and technical knowledge within
an industry group. Because of this shared production a multi-
client SBU could not be effectively managed autonomously from
a proprietary study SBU. Another argument against study seg-
mentation is the preferences of the staff. Most of those inter-
viewed prefer a certain mix of multiclient and proprietary work;
they would not be pleased with a permanent shift in this mix.
V.B.4 New-Repeat
New versus repeat business is an extremely critical
dimension to successful consulting, repeat business having great
advantage because it is less competitive to win contracts when
a long-standing relationship with the client exists. Developing
new business is a demanding activity and the marketing skills
and incentive system required may be somewhat different from
those required in preserving repeat business, all factors justify-
ing specific managerial attentions. Nonetheless, forming SBUs
around this criteria has one crucial drawback - it destroys
continuity in client relationships. Clients would be "allocated"
to a new group of people as soon as they became comfortable with
the new business SBU people. Also, a segmentation on this
criterion would result in SBUs that were very interdependent;
growing the repeat client SBU would hinge strongly on growing
the new client SBU.
V.B.5 Firm Contact - Function/Purpose - Technology - Expertise
All these dimensions are either highly correlated with
the industry dimension or are captured by an industry segmenta-
tion. For instance, where the function/purpose dimension would
form three SBUs - industrial marketing, International marketing,
and financial services - the industry dimension would identify
those same SBUs and would more finely delineate the industrial
marketing SBU into each of the individual industries.
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V.B.6 Industry
This is the chosen segmentation for two primary reasons.
First, all principals agreed that this is the most reasonable
segmentation to use. This support probably stems from observable
attributes of their business plus their strong orientation to
that framework based on tradition at Econology, in itself an
important consideration supporting the choice of industry SBUs.
Second, these SBUs are independently manageable units.
Few synergies presently exist between industry areas, although
more may be possible. For instance, some industry marketing
principals suggest that it might be worthwhile to link inter-
national business to domestic industries, gradually developing
international practices in all industries. However, the industry-
type SBUs are currently quite independent, each having its own
client base, labor pool, and methodologies (with international
having a distinct methodology because of its complex affiliate
relationships.)
V.C. Other Factors Defining SBUs
Data from principals, clients, and competitors concerning
critical success factors (CSFs) were also factored into the
definition of SBUs. (CSFs for SBUs are examined in detail in
the next section.) Although principals emphasized industry
expertise, the general finding from client and competitor inter-
views was that this was not as much a CSF as the principals
suppose. Instead, functional expertise (i.e. industrial and
consumer marketing) was emphasized, supporting a grosser SBU
segmentation.
Having only a limited amount of interview data reduced
the possible refinements we could meaningfully consider as
bases for SBU definition. It is not useful to define the
SBUs at a level of detail beyond that for which it is possible
to obtain information about strategic position. Principals
were able to effectively address distinctions in strategic
position between the industry practices. However, we were
only able to interview a small sample of clients and competi-
tors, too few to make very strong and reliable conclusions
about E's businesses at the industry level. Thus, we limited
much of our analysis derived from client/competitor inter-
views to statements probably true for all of E's SBUs.
Nonetheless, at any stage in our analysis, we differentiate
as much as the information allows with respect to eight SBUs:
Industrial Marketing SBUs
- Power Systems
- Textiles
- Automotive
- Petroleum
- Aeronautics
- Railroads, Shipping
- International
- Financial Services
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VI. SBU Profiles
VI.A. Explanation of Procedure
An understanding of E's corporate strategic position is
possible through detailed examination of the individual SBUs.
Although the relevant strategic factors will not be the same
for each SBU, they can be categorized under two dimensions:
market attractiveness and competitive business position. Market
attractiveness is a composite measure of factors describing
how desirable it is to participate in the SBU's particular
market; this attractiveness is measured relative to all con-
sulting markets. Competitive business position is a composite
measure of the factors essential for success in the SBU's
current market, measured relative to the SBU's competition.
A factor is called a critical success factor (CSF) when per-
taining to business position and a critical market factor (CMF)
when pertaining to market attractiveness.
Measures of these critical factors were only occasionally
directly quantifiable, such as gross revenues and SBU growth.
Many measures are not quantifiable such as rate of change in
client's technology, price competition, or industry expertise.
Whether or not something is tangible does not necessarily re-
late to its measurability. Some tangibles cannot be measured,
such as how the loss of key consultants or how the number of
professionals affects an SBU's business position. However, some
of the tangibles can be measured, e.g., depreciation. The only
requirement we placed upon a critical factor is that it be
strategically meaningful.
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To be meaningful, we avoid what might be termed "false
concreteness." For example, claiming a 26% market share when
the variance on this estimate is very large gives a false sense
of precision which may cause a wrong decision. For this
reason, we chose qualitative measures that are more accurate,
such as weak, neutral, or strong, when assessing the SBU position
relative to a critical factor.
Our analysis is in four parts, each part centered about
a certain source of information, 1) information from SBU princi-
pals, 2) industry sales analysis, 3) information from client
interviews, and 4) information from competitor interviews.
SBU principals each identified five to eight CSFs and
CDWs; each is discussed concerning its importance and effects.
Organizational factors are emphasized and in particular the
compensation system is described along with its effects.
Critique and recommendations of the organization or compensation
system are reserved for the conclusion of this report. An
initial composite assessment of each SBU's strategic position
is made.
Historical and projected industry sales are analyzed
relative to SBU sales. This data basically confirms principal
interview data concerning anticipated industry growth. Also,
the concept of limited sales per principal is introduced and
supported by revenue data.
Information from client interviews is divided into five
major issues, which relate directly to SBU CSFs and CMFs. The
marginal impact this information has on the initial SBU position
assessment is summarized at the end of the section. Our selec-
tion of clients was based on lists provided by Econology; clients
for the Financial Services were not included on this
list. (Presumably Financial Services is too young a business,
two to three months, to have developed a client base.)
Information from competitor interviews is primarily
relevant to CSFs. Two types of competitors are studied, those
in direct competition with E (i.e. industrial marketing con-
sultants) and those which would be in competition with E if E
changed its focus to general management or strategy consulting.
Although clients themselves compete with E through internal
market research departments they are excluded from this section
having already been discussed in the client interviews section.
Information from direct competitors reveals nothing new about
E's competitive position with respect to each CSF, but it does
indicate that functional expertise is a more important CSF
than was believed by E's principals. Interviews with strategy
and general management consultants disclose an entirely new
set of critical success factors to be contended with if E's
strategy changes.
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VI.B. Profile Results
Before discussing the four sections, we give the results
of our complete analysis concerning the current status of E's
SBUs. The tables in Figures 9 and 10 summarize the CSF and CMF
for each SBU. A position (weak (W), neutral (N), or strong (S))
is given only for those factors of critical importance as
assessed from principal interviews. A plus (+) or minus (-)
sign indicates that interviews with clients or competitors
marginally influenced our original position assessment. A
composite rating (W,N,S) of market attractiveness and competi-
tive position for each SBU is formed, based more upon subjective
considerations than any quantitative algorithm. E's current
strategic position is visually constructed on a market attractive-
ness/business position profile in Figure 11; using the composite
ratings each SBU is plotted on that matrix as a circle with area
proportional to its 1979 annual sales. Recommendations for
further actions to improve this portfolio are given in the con-
clusion of this report.
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VI.C. Information From SBU Principals
VI.C.1 Methodology and Results
Two to three hour interviews were held with each prin-
cipal discussing factors relevant to their SBU. Interviews
were held at the corporate office and focused around a list of
potential CSFs and CMFs. Casual discussions prior to these
interviews provided suggestions for critical factors which were
organized into a questionnaire to be filled out during the
subsequent interviews. The questionnaires, shown in Figures
12 and 13, listed potential critical factors (blanks were left
for additions during the interview) and requested the weights,
optimal condition, and SBU position for each critical factor.
Weight referred to the importance of the critical factor in
determining the position of an SBU; in utilizing the questionnaire
it was only possible to use weights to separate important from
unimportant factors. Optimal condition described the manner
in which the critical factor would improve the SBU position.
SBU position was measured as weak (W), neutral (N), or strong
(S) on the basis of the SBU's current status. Each principal
identified five to eight CSFs and CMFs of critical importance
to his SBU. This data is summarized in two tables, in Figures
14 and 15. To explain the meaning of these positions each CSF
and CMF is defined in the subsequent pages.
For most factors, SBUs differed on weights and position,
although all principals of the industrial marketing SBUs felt
each CSF or CMF would affect their SBU in the same general
90
direction. For example, principals for both Chemicals and
Packaging felt market share had a positive influence on their
competitive position but Chemicals ascribed a much larger
importance to it.
The SBUs were similar in weight and position on only
those factors directly related to Econology's organization. These
were the CSFs of management effort and staff development.
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VI.C.2 Definitions of Critical Success Factors
Market Share:
Market share is measured as the ration of SBU sales
of market planning/research firms competing in the same mar-
ket niche. It has a positive impact on competitive posi-
tion, primarily because it improves visibility and ima'ge.
The intangible nature of a consulting project makes the prod-
uct difficult to examine before purchase, so a buyer is like-
ly to heavily weigh any available comment on the firm's qual-
ity. Visibility and client awareness are essential for ser-
vices not amenable to grocery-style distribution. For in-
stance, ADL gets some sales simply because it is well-known;
corporations with no previous consulting acquaintances have
28
called ADL asking for "Dr. Little." At Econology, prin-
cipals commented:
"Being larger demonstrates experience, gives con-
tacts, establishes reputation. ADL and SRI have
this."
"For some industries, such as the regulated ones,
large market share is important. It is not so
important for other areas."
SBU Growth:
Growth is defined as real growth in sales dollars.
Other more abstract dimensions of growth, such as growth in
professional knowledge or growth in becoming more known to
the markets, are reserved for discussion with other critical
factors. Real growth can benefit the organization by cre-
ating more opportunities for promoting staff and by serving
28 Discussion with ADL staff member.Discssio wit
as testimony to potential clients that E does good work.
Principals feel growth has a positive influence on position
unless taken to the extreme, when it may cause organization
and quality control difficulties.
Buffering of Cyclicalities:
Reducing the impact of business downturns is not a
critical factor for any SBU. There are four possible ex-
planations for this attitude: 1) recent periods of business
prosperity have dulled awareness of the potential effect of
a recession, 2) marketing planning/research market is so un-
saturated that its growth trend cannot be perturbed by a re-
cession, 3) marketing research/planning is not affected by
cyclicalities even in a mature market, or 4) E multiclient
studies effectively buffer cyclicalities. The fourth expla-
nation appears to be the dominant argument:
The perishability of services, unlike a manufactured
product, make it impossible to have inventory and thus have
smooth production throughout demand fluctuations. The multi-
client study evades some of the perishability arguments by
being salable over a period of time (perhaps in excess of a
year) to many clients; in other words, multiclients may be
inventoried. Another buffering feature of multiclients is
their low per client price which makes them attractive to
cash poor businesses. Principals felt multiclients in-
crease the visibility of E. Essentially E trades immediate
profits for long-run increases in profits (through visibility)
during business slowdowns. E's multiclient emphasis
during business downturns is displayed in Figure 4 (Chap-
ter III). An unresolved issue is whether multiclients ap-
pear countercyclical because of their innate characteris-
tics or because they are promoted with added intensity dur-
ing business downturns.
Sensitivity to Client Market Trends:
An in-depth understanding of the client's business
makes a consultant more marketable and reduces start-up
costs in performing a particular project. Multiclients as-
sist E in understanding a client's industry by keeping them
informed in specific areas of a market they are interested
in. One principal commented, "We use multiclients to keep
informed and thus use them more during rapid market evolu-
tion."
Pricing (high, low, leadership):
Although on appearance a tangible attribute, the
price per unit is quite vague because of the ambiguity sur-
rounding the definition of a service unit. Nonetheless,
principals have a clear concept of E's consulting price
relative to competition. Because price may be perceived as
indicating quality, its effect on business position is am-
biguous. With the effects of price implying service quality
removed, all feel price negatively affects SBU positon.
Most principals feel that prices, within a broad range
around their own, are not critical factors.
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Number of Professionals:
Principals feel the number of staff generally has a
positive impact on position. Size increases visibility,
credibility, and can serve as a resource by making E more ef-
ficient. For example, a large staff can lead to added effi-
ciencies through increased specialization and reduced pro-
duction stress during minor demand fluctuations. Competitors
cite 50 to 100 professionals as the ideal size for any one
geographical location. They also feel at least a few million
dollars in sales is necessary for the firm to be relieved
from minor demand changes or scheduling problems.
Proprietary Accounts:
Long relationships with clients who frequently use
their services are considered a positive influence on SBU
position. Companies tend to use a consultant they have known
for a long time because he is the first to come to mind and
because he intimately understands their business. One prin-
cipal identified three additional advantages; "First, it is
more expensive to get new accounts, second, proprietary ac-
counts are a sign of success, and finally, they are less sen-
sitive to economic downturns."
Economies of Scale and Experience Curves:
One form of efficiency may be derived from having
larger studies; in other words, a $50,000 study may be more
profitable than two $25,000 studies. Most feel this can be the
case in some instances, i.e. the $50,000 study could be more
100. -
profitable. The effect is most pronounced in the SBU with
the largest average study size, International. One princi-
pal pinpointed the critical elements of savings and cost
with a larger study.
"Large studies have economies of scale with man-
agement time. Maybe we have one more meeting on
a large scale study than a small one. So twehty
$10,000 studies would involve 60 meetings
whereas one $200,000 study would have only 4 or 5
meetings! But profit margins are built into the
billing scheme so profitability is somewhat a con-
stant percentage to sales. Actually, big studies
can be less efficiently executed when first en-
countered so profitability can fall."
Another form of efficiency may be derived from ex-
perience curves. It takes approximately one year for a
green staff member to become a reasonably experienced con-
sultant. Principals felt they did not differ significantly
from their competitors on this factor.
Sophistication of Service:
This refers to E's methodology relative to competi-
tors and to the state of the art. Fancier services may im-
prove position, but in many cases, either clients would not
fully recognize the added quality or complicated recommend-
ations would be more difficult to implement. One principal
commented:
"As clients get more sophisticated they want more
numbers. They would like to see consumer research
type tools applied to industrial marketing. I do
not always feel this consumer approach has merit
in industrial markets."
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Industry Experience/Expertise:
As the industry-segmented organization suggests, E
emphasizes industrial expertise. Most principals feel it
is a major asset. The International SBU differs in that
it relies on regional expertise and within that geographic
region works with all industries. Principals in industrial
marketing mentioned several advantages to having industry
experience.
"Clients don't want to pay a consultant to learn
about their industry."
"Clients think it is very important for a con-
sultant to understand their industry thoroughly.
Sometimes I think they may overemphasize its
true value."
Functional Experience/Expertise:
Although a positive influence on position, only half
of the principals feel functional experience/expertise is
a critical factor. This factor concerns the market research/
planning function for industrial markets.
Other functional knowledge felt useful in consulting
at E included strategic planning and certain technical en-
gineering competence. Principals disagreed over E's
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expertise in strategic planning and some felt E's technical com-
petence had faded in recent years.
Market/Sales Effort:
Marketing improves the position of all SBUs. Mar-
keting is differentiated from the hardsell. Hardselling is
perceived as not identifying markets and cultivating nbeds
but rather force fitting the clients into an available prod-
uct through perhaps extreme techniques. Marketing requires
a flexible service, adapting to satisfy customer needs, and
most importantly, developing an awareness of client needs.
Promotion develops this awareness and, in addition, develops
client awareness of E and what it can do. Most principals
feel more promotion is needed.
"Promotion is a crucial element and for my business
group we certainly need more of it, either through
freeing up more of my time to promote or by getting
more principals into this industrial market."
Quality of Analysis:
As expected, high quality studies improve SBU posi-
tion. Much of the quality stems from other CSFs, such as in-
dustry and function expertise. Principals see quality as es-
sential for repeat business, although some feel that quality
beyond a certain point is not recognized by the client. This
may be a consequence of insufficient marketing - the client
must sometimes be shown that the work is of high quality.
Some principals feel E's staff is not improving the studies
at a pace equal to E's growing professional standards.
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"At times the staff can be too parochial. They do
not add enough extras to the studies to satisfy my
gradually increasing standards of quality, such as
adding comments on financial analysis."
Image and Reputation:
All principals accentuate the importance of this fac-
tor. The key to its importance lies in intangibility of con-
sulting services. Since you cannot touch, try on for size, or
even quantify a marketing study, a client must put much weight
on his subjective perception of the consultant. He hopes the
image and reputation are unbiased estimators of the quality
of the consultant's work. Client organizational politics also
play a role in making image important in consultant selection;
as one principal pointed out, image can leverage a consultant
into a firm under political circumstances.
"This factor is very important. There is a tremend-
ous burden on the client to hire a well-known and
respected consultant. If he doesn't and the project
goes bad, he can expect the boss to say, 'Why didn't
you hire Booz, Allen & Hamilton?' If he does hire a
Booz and the project goes bad, he can always say,
'But I hired Booz, Allen.'"
Visibility:
This factor measures the market's awareness of E, in-
dependent of whether this perception is good or bad. Most
feel this is a critical factor which improves an SBU's posi-
tion, assuming the SBU has a high quality reputation. The
plot below shows SBU positions relative to quality and visi-
bility. Both measures are relative to competition and are
constructed from our own perceptions gained through inter-
views.
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HIGH QUALITY
Railroads, shipping
Automotivee
International
*Aeronautics
*Petroleum
*Financial Services
(very uncertain
quality estimate)
ePower Systems
*Textiles
HIGH VISIBILITY
Top Management Effort:
When discussing CSFs pertinent to the organization, it
is important to stress that the viewpoint used is an absolute
onenot one relative to competition. Assessing E's organiza-
tional strengths and weaknesses relative to its competition
would require sensitive competitive information on profession-
al growth and satisfactions rarely available in reliable form.
Nonetheless, the factors are competitively informative since
improvements in organization design may strenghten E's strate-
gic position.
Principals identify a lack of management at the cor-
porate level. This is not attributed to an incompetent or
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untalented administration, but simlyv to an inadeauate amount
of time being allocated to the chores of management by top
management personnel. The chores of management are segmented
into two levels pertaining to the responsibilities of the
Chairman and the President and pertaining to the responsibili-
ties of the Principals.
Some of the duties of the Chairman and President:
- Corporate-wide planning
- Organization development
The duties of the Principals are SBU specific and
emphasized the following:
- Staff development
- Business promotion
The budgeted breakdown for managerial time is consist-
ently violated by many top personnel. Promotion and adminis-
tration are usually sacrificed for project work. It appears
that forsaking staff development for project work could en-
danger the quality of the staff, leading to even more Princi-
pal attention being devoted to projects in order to maintain
quality. This cycle of exchanging staff development time for
direct consulting time leads to a less competent staff. Re-
quiring Principals to spend even more time on consulting can
easily stunt firm growth, unless management is willing to
sacrifice short-run sales derived from project work to edu-
cate and develop their staff.
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Some typical interview statements commenting on the lack of
time devoted to management are:
"The Chairman and President "play manager" 5 to 10
days per year, consulting the rest of the time.
Who is running the company? Not the executive com-
mittee; it is composed of people running their own
consulting projects. The President and Chairman
are good consultants but may not be so good as man-
agers - they fall back to the areas of least re-
sistance. The principals in general should do more
promoting."
"Econology is very poor at forecasting its own ex-
pected volume of business, always underestimating
and ending up understaffed. The result is not
enough time for the principals to develop new cli-
ents. Someone must run E."
"E is undermanaged, especially with respect to plan-
ning. Top management has been afraid to look at
administration for fear that their personal bus-
inesses would fail if they did so."
"Principals could/should do more promotional work.
I could really sell because of my reputation, but
I can only make very few calls on new business per
year (less than 10). Most "promotional time" is
really other administrative work or answering
RFPs."
"Most principals could contribute by doing more sell-
ing and promotion but they perceive themselves as
stuck in their current roles because they can do the
work better than their subordinates."
"I currently spend 2 1/2 days as a symbolic parti-
cipant on every project in my division (at meet-
ings with the client)."
(This principal has twelve to fifteen projects in
process at any time, each about two and one-half months long.
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This means he spends 12 to 15 days/month as an observer at
meetings - with three years of 25 - 30% growth, he will be
spending all his time in such meetings as an observer.)
This last quote is indicative of how strongly management
can be constrained by the current structure.
Why managers are not managing is addressed from sev-
eral angles: (1) the Principals, and especially the Chair-
man and the President, are irreplaceable in their consulting
roles; in other words, staff skills have not evolved to.the
point of assuming a significant share of the present project
work burden from the Principals, and (2) the financial com-
pensation scheme does not provide incentives to assume mana-
gerial duties. Their first reason concerns staff development,
which is a common CSF for all Principals.
Staff Development:
Inadequate staff development can have dire consequenc-
es on the longevity, as well as the growth, of any profession-
al service organization. In service firms all levels of staff
have contact with the client, creating pressure to present
highly competent professionals. The human nature of a pro-
fessional firm's assets creates added pressure to maintain a
competent staff. A senior principal may die, wish to retire,
or simply switch into a more complex or different work area;
therefore, it is essential to have a reasonable replacement on
hand. All these factors make staff development a high
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priority to Econology.
Interviews data indicated Econology has a weak position
in reference to this critical success factor. However, where
Econology stands relative to its competitors is unresolved.
One principal commented that, "Although Econology is weak on
staff developement and training, it seems most consulting
firms are also weak."
The manifestations of weak staff development are high-
lighted in the following areas, which are supported by inter-
view comments.
A. Middle management is too slow. Principals are forced to
perform a disproportionally larger amount of work just
to meet deadlines.
"Middle staff cannot handle my work because they are
too slow and less skilled. I can write a proposal
in one hour and my subordinates need two days (and
a request for proposal may often come in with only
two days to respond)."
"I have several MBAs on my staff who could inter-
pret the data they collect if they had enough time,
but it takes them twice as long as me."
B. Principals do not have faith in the unsupervised quality
of staff. Note that the conservative use of staff may
lead to this self-fulfilling expectation, i.e., no
responsibility for staff leads to few skills, leads to no
responsibility, etc.
"The staff members gather data; the principals
analyze. Promotion depends on how quickly the
staff member volunteers and is capable of analysis
(Note: the majority of principals have not been pro-
moted ihternally.) The principals' involvement is to
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insure quality control throughout, reviewing inter-
views to see if a subtle point was missed by the in-
terviewer which should be emphasized in the future."
"The stability/competence of the staff is a critical
success factor (CSF) for Econology as a whole, on
which we are weaker than we would like."
"Staff development is a CSF; our career development
is weak."
C. Some middle management people are leaving Econology.
"We have had a problem with middle management leaving
because of stagnation just below the principal level.
Also, new recruits who were quite qualified have left
Econology due to the initial "stress test" they were
subjected to as a result of E having no emphasis on
staff training.
D. Insufficient number of middle management staff members, as
evidenced by the number of professionals at .different hier-
archial levels (shown in Figure 6.).
There are eight reasons cited for poor staff development:
1. There is not enough internal promotion.
"Econology should promote staff internally, not implant
principals from the outside (less than half of E's prin-
cipals are homegrown). If you do the latter, you lose
seasoned, valuable middle level staff."
2. Consultants do not have close contact with principals.
"We have discussed the need for a training program
since 1974. The President believes training is the
responsibility of the principal. At present there
is a one day process orientation plus new consult-
ants spend 60 days at half-billing rate to get on-
the-job training. In the past when the company was
small, new staff worked closely with the principals
because the principals were the true consultants.
Now the principal only participates on projects at
the client meetings, so the consultant only sees the
principal (and receives his otj training) on the air-
plane to the final client meeting. There is little
vertical communication and correspondlingly little
training."
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3. The consultant has nowhere to go to safely complain or
air his grievances.
"The principal controls the life of the consultant
(since he only works in one industry group); the
consultant has nowhere to go if he is not getting
along with his principal."
4. Standards of employment have dropped making it more diffi-
cult to train and rotate people within Econology.
"Econology needs to be more aggressive about filter-
ing out its weak people."
"There is infighting over technical versus nontech-
nical people. Thus recruiting standards are not
common and rotating people among various SBU becomes
more difficult."
5. Rotation of staff is minimal, impeded by different recruit-
ing, standards (as discussed above), the efficiencies due
to staff specialization, and the staff wanting to develop
an industry reputation to gain sales (a major determinant
in salaries and promotion).
"Mobility of staff between industries would be desir-
able for breadth, but it is not possible for the more
technical industries (like mine)."
"Rotation of staff between industries would be useful
at the low levels but it is risky for the principals
to use inexperienced staff."
6. Principals feel clients resist a heavy delegation of bus-
iness responsibility to their associates.
"... has had some negative feedback from clients when
he tried to shift business to associates. It is dif-
ficult to delegate responsibility downward."
"There is a crisis at the associate level - we need
to push responsibility downward but you cannot just
reassign clients to subordinates; the client must
accept the subordinate as the primary consultant and
contact."
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?. No formal training exists to bring consultants smoothly
into Econology's operations.
"New people are given a two-day orientation and 60
days at half-billing."
8. The compensation system is geared to short-run sales;
only the owners have any long-run incentives to inVest in
the development of the staff. Perhaps not coincidentally,
the only two principals who have developed other princi-
pals to work for them are the Chairman and the President,
both of whom enjoy large ownership of the firm.
"I feel that career development may be better in
Power Systems (the industrial SBU which the Presi-
dent runs) than in the other groups."
In summary, Econology is perceived by its own manage-
ment as weak concerning staff development. Even if not weak
relative to its competition, Econology could substantially im-
prove its position by improving staff development.
The compensation system was repeatedly referred to as
a factor affecting Econology's position on its management and
staff development CSFs. Although this system itself is not a
CSF, its importance warrants discussion.
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Compensation:
This section is in three parts: description of the
current compensation system, analysis of this system suggest-
ing possible deleterious side effects, and interview comments
supporting the critique.
Description of the System
Compensation is based on sales dollars and subjective
factors, with the relative weighting depending on the hier-
archical position of the employee. Employees receive both a
base salary and a bonus which ranges from 10-50% of the base
salary. The proportion of bonus to salary increases with sen-
iority.
Salaries are based on position and performance. Bonus
is based on sales credits plus subjective factors. A portion
of the price of a project is awarded as a sales credit to
employees according to their participation in the contract.
Sales credits are granted for passing contacts, giving a lead
on a contract opportunity, proposal writing, and closing sales.
The majority of credit accrues to whomever closes the sale.
The total allocation of sales credit to participants must equal
100%.
If a subordinate does not believe he has been given
enough sales credit for his contribution, and his principal
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will not adjust the allocation, he may take his claim to "ar-
bitration". Three disinterested principals will decide if he
should be given different credit. This has been done on sev-
eral occasions and the credit was granted; however, in some
cases ill-will was created.
In order to get a bonus for sales credit dollars, one's
credits must first exceed some absolute amount (roughly as fol-
lows):
Principals $ 100,000
Senior Associates 40-50,000
Associate 20-30,000
For those who exceed these thresholds, there is an amount which
will be algorithmically calculable as the bonus. It is based
on the division of the total bonus pool among those who quali-
fy in proportion to their excess credits over the thresholds.
The subjective component is smallest for principals,
while it is the sole factor below associates. The officers
review the principals, and the Executive Committee reviews all
other professional staff employees (down to research assist-
ants). All.employees are ranked by all their superiors for
whom they have worked. High marks from many superiors means
a good bonus. The committee looks at the sales credits earned
by associates, etc. to see whether they were earned through
the employee's own initiative or through work assigned to them
by others. The more of the former, the higher the subjective
component of the bonus.
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The bonus pool is approximately 25% of Econology's
operating profits.Portions of the bonus pool are allocated to
different components of the compensation:
Portion of
Bonus Pool Allocated to
1/3 selling staff based on algorithmic calculation
'1/6 selling staff based on subjective factors
1/2 entire staff based on subjective factors
Analysis
The goal of a compensation system is to reward people
strictly on the basis of their contributions to the value of
the firm. Although useful as a basis of comparison, such a
goal is impossible to achieve in any practical application be-
cause of the immeasurability of the value of the firm and the
individual contributions to that value. To see how close
Econology is to achieving this goal we must understand 1) what
sort of employee behavior is induced by the system and 2) .how
does this behavior affect the value of the firm.
The first order effect on employee behavior appears to
be aggressive selling. In fact, basing the algorithmic calcu-
lation of bonuses on the proportion of sales credit in excess
of the thresholds reinforces competitive behavior within the
firm, i.e. it pays to be the top selling principal. For ex-
ample, consider a firm with two principals, one with sales
credits of $125,000, another with credits of $600,000. The
principal with the higher sales is much better off under. Econo-
logy's allocation scheme rather than a scheme dividing up the
bonus pool as a straight proportion of sales.
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Percentage of sales-based pool
allocated to principal with:
$600,000 sales $125,000 sales
Proportion of sales 83% 17%
Proportion of Excess Sales 95% 5%
(Econology scheme)
To escape this costly effect, a principal may quickly
increase sales to high values in the general range of other
principals (approximately $400,000 to $600,000). Once at
that level the principal has very little time to manage or de-
velop staff.
The strength of this sales incentive depends upon the
factors used for the subjective bonus distribution and the am-
ount of the base salary. If the subjective factors are related
to sales and the base salary is low (so the bonus constitutes a
large proportion of personal income), then the sales emphasis
is exacerbated. One principal did comment on a low base salary.
"At the principal level, compensation is a problem
because income is so volatile. Base salary
increases and bonuses move up or down together.
This is hard on people in terms of setting a
standard of living. With inflation continuing,
this may be a real danger in the future."
Assuming sales are emphasized, the compensation may
have a deleterious impact on the long-run firm value. Princi-
pals may not find enough time to develop their staff, stifling
firm growth. They may also find little incentive to pass
along good contacts or leads to their subordinates and reserve
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the difficult sales for themselves. Comments from principals
support these possibilities.
"Principals are motivated by the bonus system to
protect their client base. They are not eager
to give leads to developing staff or to the new
principals working in SBUs acquired by the firm."
"Incentives are not in place to help others within
the firm."
"Our internal structure cannot meet the market op-
portunities. There is little motivation for prin-
cipals to develop staff. Financial incentives
could help if designed with that goal in mind."
We return to this issue when outlining our recom-
mendations to Econology in Chapter VII.
VI.C.3 Definitions of Critical Market Factors
Volume:
The dollar size of the SBU's market adds to the mar-
ket attractiveness. Most principals viewed their markets as
very large, although the growth may be small or decreasing.
Real Growth:
Real dollar growth of the SBU market excludes nomin-
al dollar growth through inflation. Again, most principals
felt this had a positive impact on attractiveness. Real mar-
ket growth measures growth in the entire market, in contrast
to SBU growth which only measures growth of the SBU's share
of the market.
Cyclicality:
Boom and bust cycles in the SBU market, whether or
not due to fluctuation in the client sales, detract from
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market attractiveness. The shorter the cycle, the more
violent will be staff transfers, hires, and layoffs.
Rates of Change in Client's Market:
Market changes refer to alterations in the client's
target market, consumer's buying behavior, distribution
channels, etc., independent of changes in the physical
product. All markets are dynamic and the greater the rate
of change, the more attractive the market is to the SBU.
As one principal noted, "E virtually thrives on changes
and opportunities in the market place."
Rate of Change in Client's Technology:
Technological changes, which alter the physical prod-
uct sold by the client, usually have substantial impacts on
the market. A new product or feature will require market
investigation into the size and form of demand. Thus, this
CMF improves attractiveness.
Price Competition:
Competition in any form is hazardous to attractiveness.
Price competition may be deleterious to attractiveness but
it is not a significant CMF for many SBUs. Industrial market-
ing is viewed as a price insensitive market within a certain
range. The services are so differentiated that price is not
a meaningful measure to compare across competitive bids.
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Client Industry Concentration:
Having many clients improves the firm's stability and
exposure. What constitutes excessive concentration was not
identified, but as a rough indication, Power Systems is quite
comfortable with 4 or 5 clients comprising 60% of their
business, implying an industry consisting of 5 or 6 large
firms is tolerable.
Service Uniformity:
The factor is a measure of the homogeneity of the
services in the SBU market. The more customized or varied the
product, the less intense the competition. However, a custom-
ized product has a minor negative side effect: it reduces
the ability of the individual firm to standardize its method-
ology. Taken together, the principals perceived uniformity
of service as an attractive factor.
Repeat Business Opportunity:
For the same reasons explaining the proprietary accounts
CSF, repeat business adds to market attractiveness. Long rela-
tionships incur little marketing expense and the studies can
be more valuable because the consultants gain an intimate
knowledge of the client. Some of the other CMFs such as rate
of change in client's market or technology may be correlated
with this factor.
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VI.D. Industry Sales Analysis
Measures of industry sales are compared to SBU sales
to check for correlations or trends. Sales figures begin in
1974 on the end of the most recent economic recession, so
data will.not reflect Econology's susceptibility to long-term
business downturns. Historical data and projections are from
the U.S. Department of Commerce 1980 Industrial Outlook.
Ideally, ratios of SBU sales to industry sales could
be used as a rough measure of market share and saturation.
As discussed in the previous section on the overall industrial
market research industry, industrial goods firms spend
approximately .1% of sales on market research. Twenty-five
percent'of this expenditure is for outside research/planning
firms. Thus, about .025% of industrial goods sales will
be distributed to outside industrial market research firms.
This ratio was not computed for Econology's SBUs due to a
lack of industry sales information sufficiently specific
to the industrial markets served by E's SBUs.
Industry sales data were available for certain indus-
try segments of some SBUs. Although these segments are not
reasonable measures of total industry sales volume (because
only sale from major product areas are included), they do give
reliable estimates of sales growth. In the subsequent an-
alysis the general term "industry sales" refers to the sum of
these industry segment sales. These real growth estimates are
compared to estimates of the real market growth made by prin-
cipals managing SBUs. The comparisons confirm the prior
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evaluations, so no readjustment is necessary. Since only sales
growth is studied, all data have been normalized such that
1975 Figure equal 100. A table summarizing these results is
shown in Figure 15.
Before individually examining SBU sales versus in-
dustry sales, SBU sales are compared to each other.
3,000,000
$2,000,000
sales
revenue
1,0000,000
individual SBU sales.
L
1974 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 'U~
A cursory glance at nominal sales dollars hints at a
$500-600,000 sales ceiling per principal. The two SBUs that
climb above two million dollars in sales differ from other
SBUs in having four principals associated with the business
unit; the other SBUs average two principals. One hypothesis
explaining this behavior would be a $500,000 sales (which must
be continually adjusted for inflation) maximum per principal;
similar limits have been found in other consulting firms (such
as Putnam, Hayes and Bartlett, Technomic, and McKinsey). At
this point Principals may become severely constrained in the
i ~ ~
-- ---
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amount of time they can devote to each of their studies and
further studies are impossible without significant quality
reductions. The impact of this effect on future SBU growth
is shown in the right hand column of Figure 15.
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MARKET ATTRACTIVENESS FACTOR
Projected Real Growth
Results
From
Principal
Interviews
Results
From
Industry
Sales
Analysis
Allowed SBU
Real Growth
Assuming
Limited
Sales Per
Principal
With No
Additional
Principals
Power Systems
Textiles
Automotive
Petroleum
Aeronautics
Railroads, Shipping
International
Financial Services N
Note: Results from principal interviews concur with
from industry sales analysis
results
Note: Limited sales per principal hypothesis implies con-
straint on how much of the industry sales growth
can be transformed into SBU sales growth.
FIGURE 15
SUMMARY OF INDUSTRY SALES ANALYSIS
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POWER SYSTEMS
300
200
100
r/
1974 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80
industry sales:
----- Econology's Power
Systems SBU
ANNUAL SALES GROWTH
SBU INDUSTRY
(4 year average) (6 year average) (projected to 1984)
35% (nominal) 10% (nominal) 3.8% (real)
Historical SBU growth figures do not support the prior
low growth positioning of this SBU. However, this high SBU
growth rate exceeding the market's overall growth may imply
an eventually saturated market. This SBU's large market share
makes saturation a more likely proposition, especially when
coupled with the low real sales growth projections. (Note
that historical SBU and industry growth rates will always be
reported as nominal rates, whereas the projected industry
sales growth is reported in real terms.)
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TEXTILES
400
300
Normal-
ized
Sales 200
100
I
/
f
I/
7 \ /
1974 '75 '76 '77
industry sales:
'78 '79 '80
------ Econology's Textiles SBU
ANNUAL SALES GROWTH
SBU
(4 year average)
39% (nominal)
INDUSTRY
(6 year average) (projected to 1984)
11% (nominal) 3% (real)
The data for this SBU follow the same pattern as the Power
Systems SBU arguments, other than the inexplicable dip in 1977.
The growth rate for E and the Industry (historical and pro-
jected) are virtually identical to Power Systems. The Textiles
SBU may also saturate its market in the future.
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AUTOMOTIVE
400
Normal-
ized
Sales 300
200
100
1974 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80
industry sales: -----Econology's Automotive
SBU
ANNUAL SALES GROWTH
SBU
(4 year average)
INDUSTRY
(6 year average) (projected to 1984)
41% (nominal) 12% (nominal) 3.3% (real)
The Automotive SBU's history is similar to the previous
two except for a noticable leveling in this SBU's sales beginning
1977. Whether this is a stochastic fluctuation or a more per-
manent plateau is uncertain. If not organizationally constrained,
it is odd that this SBU's sales would suddenly grow at a rate
less than the automotive industry's sales.
. *
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PETROLEUM
200
Normalized
Sales 150
100
-4'--
1974 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80
industry sales: ----Econology's Petroleum
SBU
ANNUAL SALES GROWTH
INDUSTRY
(4 year average)
2% (nominal)
(6 year average)
13% (nominal)
(projected to 1984)
4-5% (real)
Historical and projected growth support high market
attractiveness. Low SBU growth indicates' a weakening market
share position.
SBU
__
AERONAUTICS
500
400
Normal-
ized
Sales 300
200
100
1974 '75 '76
industry sales:
'77 '78 '79 '80
--- Econology's Aeronautics
SBU
ANNUAL SALES GROWTH
SBU
(4 year average)
48% (nominal)
INDUSTRY
(6 year average) (projected to 1984)
11% (nominal) 8-10% (real)
Industrial growth is expected to be phenomenal through
the 1980s, providing a vast market for this SBU to attack.
SBU sales have grown rapidly and consistently, except for a
drop in 1978. Future market growth greater than that of any
other E industry area supports the prior high market attractive-
ness position surmised from principal interviews.
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N/
................
!
__ __
__ L
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INTERNATIONAL
300
Normalized
Sales
200
100
1974 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80
industry sales:
,US exports
- Power Systems
-Aeronautics
- Textiles
- Petroleum
- Automotive
----Econology's International
SBU
ANNUAL SALES GROWTH
SBU
(4 year average) (6 year averag
INDUSTRY
*e) (projected to 1984)
36% (nominal) 14% (nominal)
The historical industry sales growth is slightly higher
for international than previously mentioned SBUs. Projected
export sales were not available in the U.S. Industrial Outlook
but all interviews suggested future growth would be high. The
higher projected growth partly confirms International's high
growth status.
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FINANCIAL SERV
200
Normalized
Sales
150
100
ICES
1974 '75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '80
industry sales:
commercial banking assets
ANNUAL SALES GROWTH
INDUSTRY
(6 year average)
9% (nominal)
(projected to
unknown
As a rough estimate, the Financial Services industry can
be expected to grow at the historical rate. However, the
attractiveness of this market lies in its being an untapped
market for consulting rather than in its absolute growth.
This SBU is in its formative stages and has no reliable sales
growth or volume.
Reliable statistics were not available for the Railroads,
Shipping SBU.
1984)
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VI.E. Information From Client Interviews
VI.E.1 Methodology
To substantiate, corroborate, or modify the preliminary
profile of E's SBU business position and market attractiveness,
we conducted interviews with several of E's clients. Each
principal recommended several possible candidates for inter-
views. We selected from these based on trying to meet with
clients for each principal and for several types of E services:
new and repeat clients on multiclient, planning program, and
proprietary studies. Unfortunately, time constraints prevented
us from obtaining observations from each cell of the (principal)
x (new - repeat) x (study type) array. Moreover, we generally
only have one or two observations in those cells we did fill,
making it unreasonable to attribute any high "statistical
significance" to the sample outcomes. In fact, considerable
subjective judgement is necessary to assess the importance of
any particular comment by a client and to then assess whether
any overall patterns are credible.
Specifically, we met with thirteen representatives of
eleven firms. Many of these firms had experience with two to
three principals on proprietary and multiclient studies. All
interviews were conducted at the E client's facility, usually
requiring one to three hours each. A prepared questionnaire
(Figure 16) was used as a framework for the interview but it
was not strictly followed. Whenever it was more fruitful,
questions were developed on an ad hoc basis to elicit the
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client's perception of E's position in the consulting industry
and his level of satisfaction with E's services.
The questions on the first page of Figure 16 are focused
on broad issues affecting E's position generally with an emphasis
on market attractiveness. The next page is more specific to E,
seeking explicit appraisal of E's services as contrasted to what
other consulting firms do or what is desired in a normative
sense; these questions are more related to business position than
to market attractiveness.
The responses show a surprising amount of homogeneity
even across industries and study type. In the following summary
of the client interviews, there are five broad issues:
-general use of consultants
-shopping policies
-use of specific consulting firms
-value-added from Econology studies
-satisfaction with Econology services
Each of these issues is presented with a textual summary
of the significant findings, and some representative comments
paraphrased from the interviews to display the range of opinions.
After all five issues are presented, there is a tabular summary
of our judgements of the implication of this information for
the SBU market attractiveness/business position profiles.
In the paraphrased interview excerpts, ellipses (..)
are used to indicate a deleted name of a client firm or a
staff members (of the client firm or Econology).
132
How did you first become aware of Econology? What work have
they done for you?
What is your firm's general attitude towards hiring consultants?
Are there capital constraints? Pressures to use (not to use)
them for particular purposes?
What conditions in your environment or organization motivate
you to use consultants? And for Econology in particular?
How do you shop for consultants? What RFP and bidding pro-
cedures?
Do you hire a consulting firm or a particular person within it?
Is this the same for small and large, well-known firms?
Do you use other consulting firms? What are the decision criteria
for choosing between them? Is price a factor? Size of the firm?
Do you have a strategy consulting firm? How were they selected?
How long-lived is your relationship with them (and how long is
it likely to be)?
Do you prefer long relationships with a few firms? How much
inside information do you provide to consulting firms (and
E particularly)? Why?
Who do you perceive to be Econology's competition? What are
their features relative to E? How available are they? How
do they compete for your business (marketing tactics and their
effectiveness)?
FIGURE 16
CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE, MARKET ATTRACTIVENESS
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What distinguishes Econology from other consultants you might
use? Price? Staff expertise (in what area)? Method, service,
reputation?
Do you have any strong image of E with respect to whether it
is a marketing research firm or a strategic planning firm. In
what ways is that distinction significant for you?
Why do you buy an Econology study? Because they have special
skills, an intelligent (engineering-trained) staff? You want
objectivity or a new perspective? You are short of staff or
cannot collect the information from your position?
What is the value of an E study? Information, analysis, problem
identification, recommendations? What is the nature of E's
analysis? Do you implement their recommendations? How? For
how long is the study valuable?
Do any other divisions of your firm use Econology, and how did
they meet Econology? Are you aware of the consultants used
by other groups in your firm? What else does E do besides what
they have done for you?
At an Econology principal's recommendation, would you introduce/
refer another E principal with whom you have not worked to heads
of other .divisions in your firm? What if you were so introduced
to one?
How much time do you think the staff of Econology spends on the
studies they do for you at different levels of responsibility?
How much confidence do you have in the staff of Econology at
different levels of seniority and responsibility?
Can you forecast how much you might use Econology in the future?
What relationship would you like to have with Econology (and
with consulting firms generally)? Cold calls, implementation,
etc.
What could E do to serve you better? More internal consulting,
more functional skills, more contact and involvement with
many stages of problem solving, more data and analysis, different
report or presentation formats?
FIGURE 16 (continued)
CLIENT QUESTIONNAIRE, BUSINESS POSITION
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VI.E.2 General Use of Consultants
Environmental and Organizational Conditions Motivating Use:
Most of the firms interviewed have contact with Econology
at a central, divisional or corporate market research or planning
department. This is advantageous in that a common role for such
departments is to serve as a clearing house for directing and
referring consultants and line divisions to each other.
At the level in the client firm where Econology has
contacts, consultants are rarely used to provide general advice
or to address recurring, vaguely defined problems. Almost
invariably they are hired to find the solution to a specific
problem identified and specified by the client. Surprisingly,
seeking an objective or third party viewpoint is not a common
motive for hiring consultants. More typically there is a lack
of internal staff capability, either due to having a small
staff working at capacity or because the problem is in a new
and unfamiliar area. Occasionally consultants are looked to
for special techniques.
Constraints on Use - Political/Budgetary:
There are often political motives for using and choosing
consultants: to cover your flanks on a new venture, because
the CEO likes a particular consulting firm, etc. Roughly half
of market research or planning departments have their own
budget for outside consulting and/or take primary responsibility
in contracting for those services. The other half serve in a
more purely information clearing house capacity with the decision
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to hire consultants in the line units. It appears to be pre-
ferable for the consulting firm to work closer to a central,
budgeted group than to line units which hire consultants on
an ad hoc basis.
Paraphrased Interview Excerpts, General Use of Consultants:
....will generally buy a study because of the lack of internal
capability due to the position or availability of their own
staff; it is not so much a question of getting an impartial,
objective view.
Even in the international projects, .... will come to Econology
with a specific problem and even key issues or questions to be
answered.
.... now uses consultants regularly for business level strategy
and market plans. Corporate marketing is a roundhouse for con-
sultants to the operating units, and also has its own budget for
augmenting divisional budgets.
Political reasons often enter into the decision to use consult-
ants, such as when a manager wants to give credibility to his
plans. Sometimes the name of the firm will be critical, some-
times the reputation of a particular individual (quite apart
from how prestigious his firm).
The very large, high level studies come at the specific request
of a senior line manager. He generally has made up his mind
that he wants/needs a study and probably has a specific con-
sulting firm in mind at the time.
Uses consultants only in unfamiliar areas (new products or
acquisitions); this is the corporate attitude. Works under
budget limit, the use of which is somewhat discretionary. A
greater than $10K expense will be informally discussed with
the boss.
uses consultants for unfamiliar areas. In addition ....
uses them for third perspective. Feels if the market is very
young, volume and growth hard to analyze (or impossible) so it
does not pay to hire consultants.
Use consultants when: (1) you do not want others to know your
firm is looking into market, (2) you do not have staff time,
or (3) you desire an outside opinion.
People in most organizations are more receptive to consultants
and recommendations the higher they are on the corporate ladder.
People in lower ranks are less secure and more defensive, not
eager to learn, critical.
136
VI.E.3 SHOPPING POLICIES
RFPs and Bidding Practices:
Most firms solicit bids from three to five consulting
firms; some of the interviewees described an explicit policy of
including a new firm among those given an RFP for each study.
Getting a few proposals gives the client an idea of the range
of price and quality available. Often the client will have a
specific consulting firm in mind despite using multiple RFPs.
Selection Criteria:
The most critical factors in selecting a consulting
firm are the match between the particular skills of the consult-
ant and the nature of the problem, and any previous exposure
to the consultant. In general the skills and resources of the
entire consulting firm are important, but the match with the
specific consultant handling the contract is also checked.
The clients generally felt they were hiring the consultant in-
stead of the firm slightly more so for Econology than for other
firms.
The size and prestige of the consulting firm also enter
the decision. Prestige is always a plus, although this usually
means a higher price perhaps offsetting the advantage. Large
size is desirable if the problem is large and complex but it
may be bad for smaller projects (for the .consulting firm), as
clients sometimes perceive it as being easier to control the
relationship with a smaller firm.
Occasionally, proximity to the client is a factor in-
fluencing the selection or RFP procedure. Several clients in
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the New York area expressed a preference for consultants in
the immediate region for ease of arranging lunch on an ad hoc
basis to discuss developing problems.
Price:
The consultant is rarely selected on price; price is
usually a negotiable factor after the firm has been selected.
The price elasticity of demand for consulting is much higher
in the lower line units than in the executive level offices.
Econology is perceived as offering a low to medium price. It
is always low when competing against ADL and SRI; E is usually
medium priced when compared to other market research firms
(even including some that do statistical analysis of consumer
data).
Paraphrased Interview Excerpts, Shopping Policies
.... adopts a deliberate policy of using smaller consulting
firms; they are faster on their feet, less expensive, and more
susceptible (or responsive) to .... influence. They are more
likely to repeat a study if it does not meet expectations.
Big jobs have more credibility if they are done by a major firm
(ADL, etc.)
In the international area, Econology has the good feature of man-
aging projects out of the Minneapolis office, giving the language
capability and cultural awareness in the field but staying in
close touch with the client.
Pricing is quite competitive in the market diagnosis consulting
industry; Econology is perhaps a little on the high side. How-
ever, no firm loses a contract solely on the basis of price.
Price is looked at carefully but more as a negotiable factor.
.... generally feels an individual is being hired rather than
the whole firm. This is true of consulting as a whole, but per-
haps a bit stronger feeling with respect to Econology as they
have no data bases on their industries to serve as a common re-
source for all members of the firm. .... does repeat business
with firms since these firms know their people and vice versa.
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If a study is going to be large and demanding of the resources
of the consulting firm, .... makes an appraisal of the overall
capacity of the firms before selecting a firm. This includes
the library, size of staff, and the nature of their report
writing process. If the study will generate a large volume of
written report findings, .... is very concerned about the firm
having in-house publishing capability (otherwise it is very
awkward for the firm to put out a good report on schedule).
Econology is medium on the first measure, size, and mediocre on
report production.
.... has a very ambivalent approach to the price of consulting
services. If a senior manager wants a study, nobody questions
the price or even the selection of a particular firm. That
particular manager's perception of the consulting firm (often
established at a presentation by the firm on its services) de-
termines the undertaking of the project and price is immaterial.
Typically, the range could be from $100K to $400K and the dif-
ference would not matter (or perhaps even be known by the con-
tracting manager). However, in lower operating levels, price
becomes ludicrously important. The managers at that level are
so concerned about appearing to get a bargain from the consult-
ants that they will cut out critical and valuable steps in the
consulting project to bring down the price by a few thousand
dollars. This is the organizational level where Econology has
its client base; Econology is not known at the top level.
Econology is by far the dominant firm for .... Company's needs.
This area is well-suited for E as it lacks much hard data; what
data there is is difficult and expensive to obtain the requires
experience.
E's price is good for their service. It is lower than
would expect based on comparison to consumer marketing consul-
ting firms.
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VI.E.4 USE OF SPECIFIC CONSULTING FIRMS
Strategic and Large Multifunctional Consulting Firms:
Most of the client firms visited had either a primary
consulting firm as a strategy advisor or a long-lived relation-
ship with one or more large, multifunctional consulting firms
for general advice. The choice of a particular consulting firm
was often political but quite stable due to the convenience
and security of a long relationship. Some clients expressed
concern over exposing too much strategic information to their
consultants; this fear was minor but was slightly stronger with
respect to Econology than with other firms (because of Econo-
logy's methodology). Most strategy firms address more general
and multifunctional problems than E with contact at an execu-
tive level where E is not known. Strategy firms often provide
a process of ongoing value, partly justifying the higher price.
Direct Competition for Econology:
Econology was compared to both smaller, less sophisti-
cated market research firms and large, multifunctional ones
like ADL, but most commented that there was no direct competi-
tion for E in industrial marketing research.
Marketing Techniques:
It was often difficult to elicit comparisons between E
and other consulting firms as the client -knew relatively little
about what skills and services E has to offer. This arises due
to E's marketing tactics. It was frequently commented that the
E principals represent themselves, not the firm as a whole.
Given that, the promotional techniques are often nothing more
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than a hasty call to see if anything new is cooking. In con-
trast, the large and well known firms sometimes have a market-
ing person who represents the entire firm to the client, or at
least the individual consultants do so when they are seeking
their own business. Moreover, the larger firms apparently
have a more nonchalant and relaxed style creating less of a
sense of hustling for sales volume.
Econology's brochures are considered useful, but other
consulting firms use mailings more effectively. Several clients
described E's marketing as insufficient; none said it was
excessive.
Awareness of Econology's Capabilities:
Every client was unaware of the majority of E's indus-
try practices, most only knowing of one or two areas besides
those with which they had direct experience. Most are willing
and anxious to make referrals to other functions or divisions
once they become aware of Econology's capabilities. This is
common practice regarding all consulting firms.
Paraphrased Interview Excerpts, Use of Specific Consulting Firms
Does not know of any other firms doing Econology style studies
of the same quality.
E had apparently hoped to use .... as a jumping off point for
work with other divisions in the corporation but has never re-
ceived a call from other divisions for reference on E; E
must not have pursued the opportunity.
.... does refer consulting firms to divisions and would trans-
fer information about E and its other capabilities to other
divisions.
ADL provides a different kind of competitor analysis than E;
analysis of competitors' strategies and management style, etc.,
not as much specific data on relative market share, etc. ADL
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also provides a methodology for the client - this is important
for justifying the large expense. Of course, ADL's work on
strategy is very multifunctional.
Marketing by the major firms is very low key. They give no
appearance of hustling for business, but are more professional
like lawyers. Econology does not convey quite such a profes-
sinal air.
.... works with McKinsey in corporate planning (strategy);
E is not known at that level.
Econology's biggest weakness with respect to other consulting
firms is its marketing, i.e. selling itself. .... doubts if
his E principal has ever contacted the president of his com-
pany.
.... perceives E as having no marketing function, just the
personal efforts of its principals, although suspects error in
this perception. Booz Allen and Arthur Young seem to have a
marketing function which is distinct from the efforts of the
individual consultants. Other consulting firms have the con-
sultants/principals selling the services of the entire firm.
ADL is especially good at this; ADL also has industry groups
which are very effective in sending out fliers, sample studies,
and canned research findings of entire industries. Perceives
Econology as lacking industry groups and not being capable of
that kind of marketing.
Some firms (ADL, SRI, etc.) are very active in advertising their
industry capabilities, often through brochures or solicitation
on participation in industry studies. Other firms fall short
in this respect, E among them, and so they tend to fall a little
out of forefront of one's thinking. However, it is also pos-
sible to do too much selling. E's principals seem to be too
busy to do much calling - even when they do, it always seems
like they are calling from the airport and are in a hurry.
.... would not like to see a client rep as the marketing instru-
ment of a consulting firm, preferring the consultants them-
selves as marketers.
.... has ADL and SRI on retainer - for an annual fee of a few
thousand dollars, they make their staff available for informal
conversation and minor research on functional or technical
issues (if projects go above a fairly small size, it is neces-
sary but easy to add a fee for services rendered). This mode
of interaction is very effective; divisions and functions
throughout .... frequently call these firms for a quick con-
firmation of a problem or solution. 3attelle also offers such
arrangements.
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Econology tends to key much more on having a single E contact
with clients than do ADL and SRI. When.... calls ADL, he is
referred to the in-house expert; when .... calls E the princi-
pal says he will find out and get back to you. This is not
necessarily bad, but it does leave .... with better awareness
of ADL and SRI's capabilities than of Econology's.
Would like to see E send out datebooks with material in it
concerning recent studies and available services. Other con-
sultants do this. .... does not know range of services offered
by E.
There are not many competitors in market survey area, but quite
a few in the industry expert area (SRI, ADL). Econology does
not compete with the McKinsey, Booz Allen end of the manage-
ment consulting spectrum.
143
VI.E.5 VALUE-ADDED FROM ECONOLOGY STUDIES
Technological, Functional or Industry Expertise:
There was surprising unanimity of client's opinions
that Econology's expertise lay in industrial marketing re-
search, efficient and effective information gathering, amd mar-
ket segmentation or profiling. While there are exceptional
cases, few clients regarded E as having expertise in the sense
they felt ADL or SRI had. They were considered very poor in
finance, fair to good in planning, and only fair in strategy.
Technological/engineering backgrounds were considered
a strength by a few clients, but this was not of major impor-
tance. A comparable number of clients equated all of E's work
to telephone surveys and consumer market research.
Study Scope and Value:
The value of an Econology study usually resided in
its profile of the market, which can serve as a useful data
base and qualitative reference on market factors for two to
five years. More often than not, Econology's recommendations
were considered obvious, although most did not complain or
praise. Most took the data from E, in which they placed high
confidence, and drew their own conclusions. However, several
mentioned that some of E's recommendations had been followed in
essentially their original form.
Paraphrased Interview Excerpts, Value Added from Econology
Studies
Econology seems to be more concerned with how many calls they
make than how much analysis they do. E falls down on putting
it all together. .... does not ask Econology for strategic
recommendations or problem structuring/definition.
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.... usually contacts Econology with a specific problem rather
than having contracts arise after a general question from E on
whether they could help in any way. .... usually specifies
the problem fairly well before they even call E. Econology
provides an integrated information base more than recommenda-
tions. Often conclusions are obvious or too grey to be sub-
stantial; .... draws its own. They look to Econology for fore-
casts giving direction of trends but not magnitudes.
.... perceives E as able to develop engineering marketing infor-
mation, particulary because they have staff with engineering un-
dergraduate degrees but lacking industry knowledge.
.... considers Econology to be atrocious in finance, weak in
planning and strategy, but excellent in market research and mar-
ket structure analysis. They are more of a research firm than
a consulting firm.
Econology provides data but these would not be so useful if it
were not for E's expertise in making them credible. In essence
they can be considered unbiased and with low variance even
though the sample size is small and the sampling technique is
informal. Econology does not try to do needlessly many inter-
views; even if it changes no recommendations, the data is use-
ful. Some studies are still useful sources of information 2
to 3 years after the study was conducted.
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VI.E.6 Satisfaction With Econology's Services
Staff Competence:
Clients were divided on describing the role of the prin-
cipal. Most said they felt it was very important to have the
principal involved in the project but felt he often only played
a supervisory role. Of those who commented, half felt the prin-
cipal contributed significant personal expertise (on the
industry) to the study; the other half felt he mostly ensured
quality control in the research. Many said they would follow
the principal with part of their business if he left Econology.
Clients believe most of the work is done at the middle
level by associates, who are generally average but developing
in capability as consultants. Below that, the quality was
felt to depreciate.
Adequacy of Methodology:
Most said the amount of contact between Econology and
themselves was adequate during the course of a study and the
effort was properly allocated to interviews and analysis by
Econology. A few complained of too many interviews and not
enough analysis.
Improvements or Changes Recommended:
The most common complaints were insufficient marketing
and inefficient report or presentation formats. The marketing
problem has already been described. All clients welcomed more
awareness of Econology and more regular contact with principals.
Some clients remarked that Econology was too rigid in its for-
mats, from proposal writing to presentation; they felt this
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might be indicative of inappropriate priorities attached to
phases of the study.
Nearly all expect to continue using Econology at a
level the same as in the past. All of the clients' comments
on satisfaction with Econology's service are included in the
following interview excerpts. These present an overly nega-
tive picture of E's image with the clients simply because most
clients were much more loquacious in describing weaknesses than
in praising strengths.
Paraphrased Interview Excerpts, Satisfaction with Econology's
Services
.... vastly prefers the prose reports to flipchart format.
The latter is too diffuse, too little information per page,
physically inconvenient.
E's principal is building a capable staff but the tie is still
quite strong to him; if he left Econology, they would follow
him and stay with E as well.
Contact with E is sufficient during studies - enough to keep
on the right track, and E is flexible enough to reverse its
direction if it is missing the mark.
E's principal probably runs around after business and does not
spend time on analysis; associate cleans up after him. In
general Econology pays its people for landing business, not
for their talent as a consultant. .... has been interviewed
by E consultants for studies for other firms and found them
frequently shallow and not able to get at key questions.
This could be because they are using a pro forma questionnaire
or are worried about getting their 4 interviews a day no mat-
ter what. .... would be very reluctant to give Econology a
significant job, e.g., new venture, organizational analysis,
or strategy evaluation. E does not have the quality of people
or structure to handle it. In contrast, .ADL and McKinsey have
some brilliant people who can find the unique solution.
.... does not care how many calls Econology makes on clients,
competitors, etc. Would be more impressed by more analysis
than by 200 (v. 75) interviews. Question: Why should E try
to make a transition to the size and status of McKinsey? Even
if they were to develop the capabilities, many clients would
probably not cross over to using them instead of the current
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powers. If they do expand their strategy formulation capabil-
ity, they should probably direct it toward smaller firms who
cannot afford McKinsey and who.do not currently have a stand-
ing relationship with a big firm. Barring a major top level
reorganization at .... , its relationship with ADL is
quite stable. .... likes prose reports more than the flip-
chart format; prose is more useful 2 years later. Econology's
justification for the flipchart tradition is that it is more
to the client's advantage to have more interviews and less
writing.
E's weakness with respect to .... is insufficient marketing.
It appears E has not tapped its potential client base at ....;
it could be calling on senior management, other divisions, etc.
E's presentations are almost painful to sit throuqh due to
the enormous volume of numbers presented. Is this a "we have
so many numbers we must be right" approach? Some firms pro-
vide summary books in prose form; E should do this at the multi-
client studies especially and also in their proprietary reports.
Referrals work well and could serve Econology if they would
make .... more aware of the range of capabilities they have.
Specifically, they should make it clear they have industry
groups, what they are, who the key people are, etc.
E should make its range of capabilities more known to ....,
especially regarding international studies. Has no complaints
about the amount of contact with Econology during studies, re-
port formats, etc. (although he reformats them personally for
a prose summary to CEO). If E expanded its scope, .... would
be interested; they are not locked in to their current relation-
ship. E's senior people could contribute by spending more time
helping .... think about its business instead of just respond-
ing to specific needs as they arise. Rate of technological
change in its markets should mean high continued use of con-
sultants.
Not having a New York City representative has hurt Econology
with .... They like to be able to sit across the table from
their consultants in a short notice. Having a New York office
would also improve E's chances for the large, process/strategy
projects. To get these, you must have exposure to the top
brass usually through presentations or lunch discussions.
Always refers good people with good firms to the executives
but before he could do this for Econology, he would need more
awareness of and confidence in the full range of consulting
capabilities. Having proximity and an ongoing relationship
.... is also critical to winning business on internal issues
or business in which the consulting firm does the majority of
problem definition work. If the relationship is not close,
the internal advice is either very time consuming to develop
and/or superficial. (In general, .... defines the problem for
the consulting firm.)
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If Econology were to offer implementation coaching or post-
recommendation follow up services, it would be attractive but
it would take several (maybe 3 or more) years to establish
credibility. Most other consulting firms offer more involve-
ment in plan development and follow-up than E does. This is
especially true for the large projects which came from a senior
executive directive.
Econology's flipchart reports are good for the talks but bad
for later reference; prose would be much more useful.
Particular the multiclient studies' reports are too large and
diffuse, vacuous with only one punchline per page. Would like
to see better quality graphics including:
-consistency of notation, data structure uniformity (e.g. if
E is going to use 3 years of history and 5 years of projections
on one page, do so throughout the rest of the report)
-more powerful and appealing methods of data representation,
with emphasis on the visual rather than the tabular.
E's principal was very knowledgeable with ability to handle
himself well with and for clients. Below him the staff is
hard-working with sufficient direction from Econology on what
constitutes a good job to be effective. However the people
at the middle level would not be able to take over projects
without the E superstructure - are these people being hired
to be workers or future managers? Staff competence depreciates
rapidly in E as the responsibility level goes down the ladder.
Econology does not recognize or acknowledge its weaknesses -
they have often tried to move from a discussion of Power Systems
to the retail business as though they were still speaking from
expertise when they are, in fact, naive in the retail side.
They are also not sophisticated mathematically; they have a very
naive statistical model (regression) for food services which is
badly designed.
Econology overstates its own impression that it is offering
strategic inputs; does not disseminate E reports up to execu-
tives (in fact he has avoided doing so because of the excessive
p.osturing by E as strategists).
E tends to approach all problems alike with the basic seven
steps (seen in every proposal) always included without any
adjustment for the weights corresponding to the need for each
step. This inflexibility is annoying. To improve, Econology
could do two things to increase its value-added.
-The typical E proposal is very vague, just a recapitulation of
the information which ... gave them in the RFP and phone conver-
-sation. Whether ... called with a specific or very loosely
.aefined general one, the proposal would look the same. Part of
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this is just expediency of production of proposals and the
appearance is worse than the effect, but it probably also re-
flects at least in part the process. Proposals should be more
specific and more substantive.
-At the final stages of a study, E feels obligated and qualified
to judge what information ... would like to see and in what form.
E should spend time talking to the client about the conclusions
and recommendations before publishing reports and defining pres-
entation formats to determine what information to bring out with
what structure. Currently they present findings as if every-
thing were of equal importance putting it all on slides for a
boring, long, unfocused report in which the key issues ire lost.
In trying to make one document serves as the presentation, report,
and historical reference, the presentation suffers the most.
Econology does not approach .... too much; perhaps E is too low
key. E should send out mailers to describe what they are doing,
and should work on a more personal relation with client (All
consultants are bad here, E actually promotes a negative rela-
tionship because the principal is condescending). E should
follow up studies, but this could make more work for E if they
are not careful. More of the process consultation is needed,
more feedback. Econology and all consultant tend to delay
sending a written report after final presentation (by 1 to 2
months). ...thinks this would improve if final payment was
delayed until receipt of report.
Econology is handling the relationship correctly right now, no
changes needed. They should stay in market survey area.
E is in a mature field with client's work. Can only spend so
much time and money on consultants.
Thinks E's relationship with his firm is excellent. The E
principal calls occasionally to find out what client is doing
and let client know what he is doing.
Econology has good staff: MBA with technical background (does
not have to be top school), not as polished as Booz Allen.
Like to know more about Econology. Would like a report in
advance of final presentation so they could understand and ask
more questions. Would then like these questions and some
answers embodied in final report.
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VI.E.7 Summary
This set of client attitudes and perception of E is
important to the extent that it gives E a more accurate or
complete self-perception. Looking at the information in terms
of positioning with respect to critical factors, the most
salient comments relate to repeat business opportunities and
price competition on the market attractiveness profile and to
marketing and expertise in the business position side.
For the firm as a whole, the following are the clients'
observations and the direction of the effect on critical
factors:
Market Attractiveness Direction of
Issues Marginal Effect CMF
.A high percentage of the + repeat business
client firms have a central opportunity
office with influence on
the use of consultants
.Most of the problems solved + repeat business
by E and its competitors are
point-in-time situations.
.The clients want more in- + repeat business
formation on E's services
.Clients feel they hire the repeat business
individual more than the
entire firm
.Price is more of a negotiable + price competition
factor than a selection criterion
.Clients regard E as having no + price competition
direct competition or as com-
peting rarely against large
firms
.There is high price elasticity price competition
of demand for consulting in the
lower levels of client firms
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Business Position
Issues
Direction of
Marginal Effect
.The problem is often fairly
well specified by the client
.E's price position is low
to medium
.E's size is appropriate
for being responsive to
the client on its projects
.Most clients have little
awareness of the majority
of E's services
.E's marketing effort is
insufficient; most clients
need more information
.Only a few clients hire E.
largely due to their indus-
try expertise (partly due
to lack of awareness of E)
.Most clients regard E as
being most capable of high
quality, industrial market
research
.E's skills in finance,
planning, strategy
analysis low
.Middle and entry staff
are fair to average quality
.Clients would be tempted
to follow the principals
if they left E
.Some complain of rigid or
inefficient proposal,
report and presentation
formats
CSF
sophistication
of service
pricing
number of
professionals
visibility
marketing/
sales effort
marketing/
sales effort
industry
expertise
functional
expertise
quality of
analysis
staff develop-
ment and middle
management
competence
staff develop-
ment and middle
management
competence
image and
reputation
Based on our judgment of the fervor behind, praises and
criticism, we believe the net effects on the profile of the whole
firm are as follows. These are adjustments to the principals'
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original CSF and CMF profiles:
Market Attractiveness Factors Direction of Effect
repeat business +
price competition +
Business Position Factors Direction of Effect
size of firm +
marketing/sales effort
industry expertise
Power Systems +
Textiles +
Aeronautics
Petroleum
Railroads, shipping
functional expertise +
staff competence
image and reputation
visibility
There are also comments suggesting that specific SBUs
should be repositioned from where the principals' own percep-
tions might place them. Most notably, E was often (but not
always) regarded as lacking industry expertise in the more
engineering-based areas relative to firms like ADL and SRI..
This was partly a result of the marketing of those firms plus
their perceived reserves of highly technical and multifunctional
resources. However, E was regarded as having excellent skills
for doing industrial market research for these industries. The
strongest and most consistent SBU specific comment was that E
is nearly without competition in power systems,
having few competitors and none who can match its quality. E
has industry expertise in this area, but its dominance may res-
ult from the fact that they face few competitors, if another
firm were to develop a consulting practice in power systems,
there would be some interest in this among E's clients. In the
textiles and automotive areas, E is variously described
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as having industry or market research expertise, but they are
always well-respected for quality and responsiveness.
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VI.F. INFORMATION FROM COMPETITOR INTERVIEWS
VI.F.1 Methodology
Competitor interviewing was not pursued to great
depth, partly because of the difficulty in finding signif-
icant competition in one particular area (industrial marketing)
and partly because no coherent picture of competition was
derived from the client interviews. After three formal inter-
views it became apparent that the current competitors to E
provide only a few constraints on E's growth unless some
completely new direction is the goal.
One interviewee characterized the consulting industry
as shown in the top five lines of Figure 16, to which we have
added our own observations from interviews and personal exper-
ience. It is a crude heuristic to understanding the industry
but is useful in demonstrating that there are differing CSFs
(and CMFs) at different positions along the distribution. Thus,
it may not be possible for a firm to move smoothly along the
spectrum by making marginal adjustments to its style or
strategy; rather major and/or discontinuous jumps may be
necessary conditions for repositioning. The industry is a
30
nice example of Michael Porter's "strategic groups" concept:
While in principle there are no production or oligopolistic
rivalry barriers to entry or to movement to any positions, the
firms within any small range in the industry have their own
30
Porter, Michael E., "The Structure Within Industries and
Companies' Performance," Review of Economics and Statistics,
March, 1978, pp. 214-227.
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ways of competing and segmenting the market, creating product
differentiation and styles which segregate the groups. At
the top are the strategy firms which set standards serving
as an umbrella for the behavior of the rest of the industry,
e.g. price, salaries for staff, etc. The perceptions of
clients of the structure of the industry are probably the most
important determinant of the inertia in that structure. If a
new firm wants to enter the strategy business, there is little
the current strategy firms can do to prevent the attempt, e.g.
there can be little predatory pricing to keep the aspiring
entrant from covering his fixed costs (which are very low
anyway). Nonetheless if the prospective strategy clients
perceive the market as being saturated by the existing strategy
firms, the entrant may have great difficulty establishing
visibility and reputation.
Our interviews were at most able to suggest how a few
firms competing with E are structured to meet their CSFs. No
formal analysis was conducted to determine what those CSFs
were. The three firms most thoroughly interviewed were
Industrial Marketing Associates (IMA), H. Pifer & Co., and
Sigma Consultants, Inc. (SCI) (disguised names).
VI.F.2 Industrial Marketing Associates
IMA is interesting in showing the differences in
resources firms may have relative to E and still be a competitor.
The firm was foundced in 1967 to conduct industrial market
research. At p'resent it has six professionals, most having only
undergraduate business degrees. They have clients in several
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industries but they do not have a formal structure based on
industry - the staff rotates among the client industries.
The industrial markets they have served include:
Compressors and heat exchangers,
Rigs and oil,
Engines and turbines,
Agricultural and chemical,
Steel,
Bank services, and
Assisting firms to reorganize their market
research departments.
The market research is conducted by telephone inter-
views (and are claimed by IMA to be effective); their product
types match those of E, proprietary and multiclient studies.
IMA was mentioned as a competitor to E by a client. In
contrast to E, IMA does not consider growth, size of the firm,
industry,expertise, or face-to-face interviews to be CSFs.
However IMA also does not aspire to become significantly broader
or deeper in its skills and position in the consulting industry;
its CSFs and strategy are appropriate for its goals, as is sub-
stantiated by its stable success record.
VI.F.3 H. Pifer & Co.
H. Pifer & Co. is much more similar to E; it is hard to
imagine a better matched competitor. Pifer was founded in 1959,
growing very slowly until the late 1960s (to about four profes-
sionals). Now they have 44 professionals selling about $3.5
million of industrial market research annually to divisions and
functional departments of Fortune 500 firms, although they also
have clients smaller than their own firm. Their primary tool
for studies is interviews in person or by phone conducted by
staff with MBA degrees (25%) and/or industrial work experience.
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Studies are of three types:
1/2 proprietary market/product planning studies on
problems defined by the client, requiring from
one man-week to several manmonths of effort.
1/3 multiclient studies requiring around two to four
staff members each putting in nine months to a
year of effort. These cost about $150,000 to
$200,000 to produce and are sold to clients for
$5,000 to $25,000 each. Sales promised before
the study is conducted rarely cover the expenses,
but subsequent sales (promoted by brochures and
price list catalogues) make these projects prof-
itable.
1/6 consumer analysis surveys. Each of several
consumer product areas are analyzed every three
years, detailing the structure and trends of
all the products and markets served by the major
producers in an industry. Clients for the
studies have subscriptions for the report.
Organizationally, Pifer has six levels corresponding
quite closely to E's hierarchy. They are recently reorganized
into five groups around client product lines which are essen-
tially industry lines:
-specialty chemicals (overlaps several industries)
-commodity and fine chemicals
-plastics and minerals
-petroleum products
-end user products (includes textiles, the consumer
analysis studies, etc.)
Each group operates as a profit center. All studies are
taken as fixed price contracts (salaries + 200% overhead + expens-
es). The founder owns 90% of the firm, but they are going to an
employee stock ownership plan (ESOP). Pi.fer has a wholly owned
European subsidiary conducting studies in the same manner as the
domestic office (including phone interviews). It is a fairly
self-sufficient office
They list the same competitors as E. They counted E
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among them but commented that E formerly was a regular compet-
itor and now seems to have redirected itself towards the gener-
ator industry. They also cite the internal staff of their
clients as a competitor, particularly in Europe where industrial
firms often have large market research departments. Pifer relies
on seminars and brochures to create market visibility and differ-
entiation for itself, using many handsome publications to des-
cribe its capabilities and past work.
Pifer differs from E in a few interesting ways: They
use some phone interviews for the same kind of research, they
have more marketing brochures, the staff is only 25% MBAs, and
they do not stay strictly within one industry until relatively
senior in their careers with Pifer. These suggest E may.also
not need to feel strongly constrained by its method or struc-
ture, i.e. it is possible to do effective and similar industrial
market research with other modes of operation. Pifer's position
obviously has implications for three SBUs at E, Petroleum,
Textiles, and International. As Pifer's greatest capability
is in Petroleum, this profile is probably most significant to
that SBU in E.
-VI.F.4 Sigma Consultants, Inc.
Moving along the distribution to an E competitor offer-
ing more services than E, we interviewed the head of the
Resources Section at SCI. The Resource Section has 19 profes-
sionals working in the areas of construction (materials and
energy conservation) and the rare and commodities metals indus-
tries. This is one of 30 sections at SCI, 1/2 of which are
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engineering and research oriented, 1/4 markets oriented (e.g.
the Resource Section) and 1/4 function or technique oriented
(e.g. strategic planning, OR). SCI tries to provide the full
range of management services under one roof; all the industry
sections.are multifunctional and in addition draw on the tech-
nical resources of the entire firm by creating project teams
specific to each contract.
The Resource Section is a poor analogue to E even when
looking specifically at the construction divisions of both.
As advertised, this division of SCI does very diverse, multi-
functional work. The range of services include:
-counseling or representing multinational corporations
in negotiations with foreign governments
-antitrust and regulatory advice
"acquisition identification and implementation
-marketing audits and marketing strategies (including
distribution, pricing, and promotion)
-cost control, financial feasibility analysis, etc.
The clients include all factors affected by the industry, such
as trade associations, regulators, investment bankers, and
manufacturers.
The Resource Section attributes its good competitive
position to these critical success factors:
-having a wealth of important contacts within the
industry and market, mostly relationships with exec-
utives developed over many years
-the prestige of the entire firm and the capability
of tailoring a multidisciplinary consulting team
from all of SCI for each contract. SCI receives
about 20% of its business as unsolicited inquiries
to the chief executive asking who in SCI can perform
a study for the caller..
-having an enormous data base on the industry
-having senior staff who are highly regarded as indus-
try experts. In effect, the position is self-reinforc-
ing, as developing staff members quickly become regarded
as industry experts due to their association with their
seniors and because of the large variety of business
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opportunities generated by those superiors
-having a multifunctional, highly talented staff
The Resource Section generally avoids taking problems
as specific as these handled by Econology. They have been able
to only take those contracts they find most interesting and
have not been concerned with growth as an objective. They
hinted that acquisitions have worked out poorly, preferring
internal development. The control system is very unconstraining
as long as staff members remain billable; there is very little
top management direction of the firm or its units. Compensation
is largely salary, with the bonus being so uncontrollable that
it is not motivating. Synergies and sharing or swapping of
staff to make project teams come about through the personal
interest's of the individuals, not because the reward system
puts a premium on such work. The compensation system does
recognize indirect contributions to the firm, such as profes-
sional publication. There is no ownership option.
It is probable that the technical and multifunctional
capabilities of firms like SCI are an attractive feature to
technological firms seeking a consulting firm to do market-
ing studies. If so, E's chemical, electronics, and energy
and environmental practices may be constrained by the strate-
gies of SCI, ADL, SRI, Battelle, etc.
The most enviable features of thd SCI consulting prac-
tice would be difficult for E to emulate. It took many years
even for the SCI Resource Section head to develop close rela-
tions with the most important managers in an industry, and he
was significantly aided by the prestige and reputation of the
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whole firm. However, SCI does have one attribute of relevance
to E: When staff members become senior (after age 55) they
may elect to work a reduced hours work week in which they take
less responsibility as active consultants and more as advisors
and mentors or management staff within SCI. This is regarded
as a nice way to taper down one's career as a consultant. Of
course, the size of the firm facilitates this practice, but it
may be modifiable to help E's principals achieve their goals
of retirement security.
VI.F.5 Other Potential Competitors
More casual interviews and personal experience with
other consulting firms revealed a different set of CSFs for-
strategy, firms and still another set for microeconomic analy-
sis firms. The former are well known for their staff re-
cruiting policies of only hiring from the most prestigious
business schools and offering enormous salaries. They often
deliberately avoid any industry orientation (partly to avoid
conflict of interest possible if working on strategic planning
for competitors) not only by structure but by use of their
staff, i.e. rotating consultants quickly through unrelated
industries to gain expertise in their strategic planning
methods. It may be important to have a model (or some feel
a gimmick) associated with the firm to be successful in this
class; BCG and its spinoffs are the classic examples of this.
Microeconomic analysis firms place a premium on functional ex-
pertise, so they are also concerned about the prestige of
their staff's academic backgrounds. Unlike the strategy firms,
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these firms do tend to have industry orientations because of
the need to be familiar with the structure of markets and
the underlying production technologies. Both strategy and
economic consulting firms try to convince their clients they
are providing expertise the client cannot duplicate.
There was little to be gained from additional formal
competitor interviews. First, there appear to be few organi-
zations which compete as entire firms with the entire firm of
Econology. Second, when the similarities are not very close
between the firms as wholes, comparison of those practices
which do overlap is difficult and not very insightful, as in
the case of SCI and E. Basically the competitor interviews
substantiate the suggestion that there are mobility barriers
between the groups of consulting firms at different positions
in the industry. If E chose to confront the large multifunc-
tional firms, the strategy firms, or microeconomic analysis
firms it would face significant difficulties in penetrating
these markets.
VI.F.6 Summary
In summary, the major implications of competitor inter-
view findings on the positions of E's SBUs reveal little
about SBU positions with respect to critical factors, rather
they alter the weights, or importance, attached to the fac-
tors. Interviews with potential competitors revealed CSFs felt
essential for success in their consulting fields. In addi-
tion, certain organizational issues general to all the consult-
ing fields were identified. These findings are listed below
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in three groups.
Competitor Information:
1. Industry e:cpertise is subordinated to functional expertise,
at least at the lower organizational levels. The ease by
which IMA and Pifer rotate staff through industries sug-
gest that E could also do so. In the process, E would
want to consider its SBUs more in functional (market re-
search and planning) terms than in industry terms.
2. Textiles, International, and especially Petroleum SBUs
at E face direct competition from Pifer SBUs.
3. Econology differentiates its methodology from its com-
petitors by stressing face to face interviews; IMA and
Pifer use more telephone and survey techniques. It is
important the client also perceive this difference.
4. A client internal staff is widely recognized by consult-
ants to be serious competition.
Potential Competitor Information:
1. Significant competition exists in the industry general
management and strategic planning consulting fields. E
SBUs in high technology industries moving toward general
management consulting may face competition from multi-
functional, multitechnological firms like SCI, SRI, and
APL. This could be a difficult barrier to overcome as
it resides in the product differentiation and firm pres-
tige as perceived by the clients. E can adopt certain
strategic approaches helping to circumvent this competi-
tion, as outlined in the strategic options identification
section.
2. CSFs in general management industry consulting (e.g. SCI)
were identified as:
a. many intimate and important client contacts with top
executives
b. overall prestige of consulting firm
c. understanding the industry, including the underlying
production technology
d. being regarded as an industry expert
e. having a bright, reliable staff with multifunction
skills
3. CSFs in strategy consulting were identified as:
a. extremely creative staff from prestigious business
schools
b. expertise in strategic planning models and organiza-
tional diagnosis
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c. many intimate and important client contacts with top
executives
d. prestige of the consulting firm
Organizational Information:
1. None of the competitors identified growth or size of con-
sulting firm as critical success factors.
2. Ownership distributed among staff did not appear necessary
for competitive success.
3. SCI has integrated an interesting system of gradual re-
tirement, by giving top management the option to reduce
workloads after a certain point in their careers. This
policy may also stimulate staff development and improve
middle management competence.
4. Acquisitions have worked out poorly for SCI, in many ways
due to organizational and political reasons.
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,VII. GAP ANALYSIS AND OPTION IDENTIFICATION
yII.A. Projecting The Portfolio
The corporate portfolio depicted in Figure 11 places
SBUs according to their present status. This status is de-
termined by the SBUs' current position with respect to'its
CSFs and CMFs. Over time, an SBU will become more or less
favorably situated along its critical factors, or those fac-
tors may change; correspondingly the SBU's status and port-
folio position change. A meaningful corporate planning hor-
izon is established by recognizing the future time period
required for critical factors to change significantly.
The five year planning horizon typical to manufac-
turing firms does not readily apply to professional ser-
vice organization (PSO). Constraints to change for a PSO
usually have shorter lead times, perhaps of two to three
years. These constraints can be roughly guaged by staff
turnover, the firm's willingness to lay off people, abili-
ty to increase fixed assets like office space, and time re-
quired to internally develop skills. In manufacturing,
flexibility is largely determined by technological obsoles-
cence and equipment deterioration, lead times in installing
new production capacity, and so on, measures more exact and
tangible than those in a PSO, leading to more precise de-
termination of the proper planning horizon.
Expected CSF and CMF modifications over a two to
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three year planning horizon were assessed from principal,
client, and competitor interviews. These are indicated on
the following chart, Figures 17 and 18. The modifications
were assessed assuming E follows its current strategy, i.e.,
no major changes in the status quo. Hence, they reflect ex-
ternal changes in the market or industry affecting E's posi-
tion. Arrows are used to denote the direction of the change
for each factor for each SBU; size of the arrows roughly cor-
respond to the impact of the factor change. For both charts,
the column at the far right summarizes the cumulative critic-
al factor change on the SBU position.
SBU position shifts from these factor changes are
displayed on a competitive business position/market attractive-
ness matrix, Figure 19. Movements are indicated by arrows, a-
gain the length of the arrow corresponding to the expected SBU
shift over the two-to-three year planning horizon. We have
not projected any changes in the size of the bubbles, since
SBU size will depend strongly on the efforts of the individu-
als whose aspirations were not appraised. To summarize the
projected movements, the portfolio is radially expanding from
the center, with SBUs moving toward the extreme positions of
high or low market attractiveness and good or bad business
position.
VII.B. Organizational and Individual Goals
Before we can prudently suggest strategies which
respond to this profile, we must consider the explicit and
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implicit goals of the the organization and its members. Any
strategy is meaningful only in terms of how readily it leads
to the realization of goals and objectives. In general, top
management's goals can serve to set objectives for the cor-
poration, but these must be tempered by the goals of the low-
er staff, or those will act as major constraints.
While we did not conduct a formal survey of the
personal goals of Econology's staff, we inferred from our in-
terviews with principals that the following are important:
- growth in the revenues and size of the firm
by 20-30% annually
- increased prestige and visibility for the firm
- larger and more stable incomes
- an easier lifestyle in the senior positions,
particularly in terms of travel requirements
- retirement security
Other goals held by different subgroups of the principals in-
clude:
- broader scope of consulting activities
- more emphasis on strategic planning
- more focus for the organization as a whole
- avoidance of a market research image
Clearly, some of these goals are mutually exclusive.
At present, no mechanism exists for airing these goals and in-
tegrating them into a set of corporate goals and objectives
which are consistent while being as harmonious as possible with
personal goals of the staff. We believe that a serious anal-
ysis of personal and corporate goals would be very beneficial
to E. Indeed it is necessary to understand and revise goals in
the light of strategic alternatives in order to choose among
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them; the processes of goal definition and strategy formula-
tion should be conducted iteratively.
VII.C. Strategic Alternatives
VII.C.l. Framework
To identify strategic alternatives for Econology,
it is useful to consider the possibilities from a very gen-
eral framework to avoid considering only marginal changes in
strategy. The most basic framework is that used to define
SBUs as autonomously manageable clusters of (customer) x
(function) x (technology) modules. Fundamentally, any stra-
tegic option consists either of repositioning a current SBU
by changing its level and manner of attack on its market or
of redefining businesses by extending or contracting along
one or more of these dimensions for one or more SBUs in such
a way as to optimize the total corporate performance. Each
of these three dimensions have multiple subdimensions which
may be manipulated. Moreover, changes in one dimension may
well not be independent of those required or possible in an-
other. Associated with any set of changes may be new or re-
vised functional requirements and organizational structure of
the firm. We will have four strategic options, the first
based on a repositioning of current SBUs and the other three
based on refining businesses.
VII.C.2. Status Quo
The first strategic option is basically enhancement
of the status quo, i.e., a reallocation of corporate resources
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into the current SBUs to selectively improve their business
positions. AE. explained in Chapter II, the classical strat-
egy models characterize certain SBU movements and portfolio
patterns as more desirable than others. Within limits,
the firm has control over its competitive position factors,
while market attractiveness is primarily determined by ex-
ogenous variables. The textbook strategy is for firms to
strive to improve the business positions of the SBUs in the
attractive markets while de-emphasizing efforts in SBUs with
low market attractiveness. Only a few of the SBUs with weak
business position should be developed, since the firm's re-
sources should not be diluted on questionable ventures; the
most poorly positioned SBUs should be abandoned.
If we were to take this strategy model literally
and apply it to E's portfolio, it would imply that E has a
fairly attractive portfolio. There are no dogs, one or two
stars and cash cows, and several question marks to serve as
the next generation of stars. What is slightly bothersome is
that the question marks may be diverging away from the desired
northeast quadrant if no strategic plan is affected. To
avert this possibility, we would recommend that those princi-
pals with "question mark" SBUs appraise the position of the sub-
industries comprising those businesses. Some of these may be
more or less well-positioned than the weighted average position
shown in the portfolio matrix given here. The principals could
direct more effort into the healthier sub-businesses. This is
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probably being done implicitly at present, but a formal an-
alysis could clarify the best way to do so.
The second implication of a classical (BCG) model
is that corporate resources should be allocated from large,
mature SBUs to the best opportunity question mark SBUs. In
this case, it makes little sense to direct surplus cash
from Power Systems to Aeronautics. However, it may make
some sense to redirect the firm's more basic resource, people,
to question marks from cash cows. For instance, the princi-
pal of the textiles industry expressed a concern that his
market is levelling out. This will constrain his own profits
and the development of his staff; perhaps they could be
more profitably directed into the aeronautics group as that
SBU wrestles for business position in its attractive market.
Of course, there are numerous obstacles to such a utilization.
First there is the question of how to compensate the principal
of the cash cow for surrendering his resources; the current
system does not support such behavior. Second, there is the
question of transferability of skills of staff moving from
one SBU to another. Based on the client comments that E's
value-added comes as much or more from functional expertise
as from industry knowledge, this may be a more superficial
than real problem.
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In general, the practical problems of applying class-
ical strategy to a professional service organization (PSO) can-
not be overemphasized. Foremost is the fact that SBUs do not
represent relatively impersonal manufacturing businesses but
the personal interests and skills of individuals. Profit max-
imization is very likely not to be a sufficient reason for a
PSO's SBU to be willing or able to reposition. Professional
goals must be assessed to make the right strategic decisions.
VII.C.3. Three Alternative Strategic Options
While this strategy of enhancing the status quo may
be an effective one, there are many unresolved questions on how
to go about realizing it. Moreover, we suspect it leaves E with
a lack of focus; a more central direction or philosophy might be
beneficial. It is not uncommon for firms to evolve at middle
age into a collection of businesses operating without regard for
a common mission for the firm. Often a business which success-
fully started by serving one product in one market experiments
with many products in many markets.
One product Many products
One
Market
Many
Markets
176
This is bad if it means that the firm loses focus or has no
detailed structure for exploiting its distinctive competences.
The loss of focus in a professional service organization can
be especially damaging because it can lessen the consultant's
understanding of his product, already difficult to conceptu-
alize due to its subjective and ephemeral nature. This ex-
planation may help account for the recent trend toward special-
ization in management consulting. As competition heightened
consultants found it necessary to specialize not only to enable
them to probe deeper into a field of growing complexity but
also to focus and thus relate their skills in a more coherent
form to the client. Thus, we recommend E consider a set of
three "pure" alternatives which involve redefinition of the
firm's businesses, but create greater cohesiveness than the
status quo.
Redefinition involves addressing the three SBU di-
mensions dealt with in section II.B.2, customer, function and
technology. In addition, these strategies can involve only
one SBU, a number of SBUs or all SBUs. For our analysis, we
look at the corporate level strategy of the whole firm.
Individual business level strategies for each SBU will be
quite similar because of the common characteristics they
share. To differentiate them to the extent that E is able
to distinguish between its locomotive and light bulb
businesses would require detailed information about the SBUs
beyond the scope of this report. In fact, before implementing
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any one or a hybrid of the recommended strategies, more detail
may be required and should be obtained by having each prin-
cipal thoroughly study his own SBU.
We perceive Econology as having three basic strat-
egies available to it; it may be possible for individual SBUs
to separately pursue these to varying degrees, creating hy-
brid combinations of the three. We have called these three
approaches 1) market planning/research (MPR), 2) industry
consulting (IC), 3) strategic planning (SP). Their basic de-
scriptions are:
Market planning/research: primary skill is industrial mar-
ket research and planning, which
is provided to all industries.
Industry consulting: primary skill is industry exper-
tise, with an awareness and under-
standing of the entire culture and
setting of an industry. Consult-
ing is provided on all functions to
each of certain industries.
Strategic planning: primary skill is strategy formula-
tion; strategic planning is of-
fered to all industries.
Note that since each of these entails a redefinition
of the business in which E participates, its current corpor-
ate portfolio SBU bubble chart gives an inappropriate profile
of where the company stands. The first option represents the
least redefinition, the latter the most. In moving from the
first to third option, we believe E's SBU business positions
become worse, i.e., the bubbles are shifted more to the right.
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However, the market attractiveness of the industry and strat-
egy consulting businesses may be slightly higher than for
market planning/research. A simple check of CMFs, as identi-
fied in the principal interviews, helps substantiate this
assessment. (The table below is filled according to our per-
ceptions formed from interviews).
Strategy
CMF MPR IC SP
Volume 0 0 0
Real growth 0 0 ++
Rate of charge of client's
market and technology 0 0 0
Price and competition 0 + ++
Repeat business opportunity 0 + +.
The relative market attractiveness of these alternatives is
debatable, and our resources do not leave us opportunity to
pursue that question in detail. The following discussion
concentrates on E's CSF position if it pursues a particular
strategy. The critical success factors accompanying a strat-
egy are drawn from the results of the competitor interviews
section.
VII.C.3.a. Market Planning/Research
Based upon our interviews with clients and com-
petitors of E, we believe the market planning/research strat-
egy is the one most consistent with the resources of the
firm and the way .it is perceived in the marketplace. It is
also the one under which E has the strongest portfolio start-
ing position, recommending it as perhaps the most viable
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option. It is a new strategy as opposed to being the status
quo because the firm is currently composed of many SBUs in-
dividually perceiving and presenting themselves variously as
market researchers, industry experts, and/or strategists,
with varying degrees of corresponding perception of their
roles by clients.
In the pure form of this strategy, all of E would
acknowledge its primary role (and skill) to be industrial
marketing research, with industry expertise and planning
skills as necessary but secondary attributes. The intent
would be to abandon the constraints placed on developing new
business by E's belief that it must have industrial exper-
tise to be credible; functional expertise would be the firm's
focal theme for differentiating and establishing itself. All
experience that E had accrued in all industries would be lev-
ered as the demonstration of functional expertise rather than
having many smaller, industry-specific records of experience
to demonstrate industry expertise. As many clients stated,
they see industrial market research skills (and not industry
expertise or strategic planning) as E's source of value-
.added, and since there appear to be few competitors in in-
dustrial market research, E might potentially enjoy a very
dominant, premiere position in this business.
Consulting Services, Description and Methods:
The production requirements of this strategy have
much continuity with the current work at E. Projects would
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remain in the same size range, with field interviews the
primary tool. It would be desirable to broaden and deepen
the staff's skill in data analysis and schematic representa-
tion methods, including statistics and graphical means of
portraying and summarizing data, plus any new methods of in-
dustrial market research being developed by academia (e.g.,
innovation diffusion models, etc.). It would be important
to be developing new products and tools regularly. New prod-
ucts might include market analysis training seminars, in-
dustry market trend news letters, marketing audits, etc. New
tools would be data bases, statistical and data analysis via
computer support, etc.
, Client Market:
These services would be provided as at present to
functional units of Fortune 500 industrial firms, but more
broadly than to just those in the current industry areas.
Brochures with an emphasis on the market research product
and general capabilities of the firm would be the primary
marketing tool. It might be possible to tie the internation-
al and domestic capabilities more tightly together. The cur-
rent industry focus of the senior staff would be retained for
some marketing purposes, but it would be less important, ex-
cept in so far as products were tied to specific industries.
Client relationships would be comparable to those maintained
at present, i.e., rather distant. This market should have
moderate growth comparable to or better than E has
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experienced in the past, as it appears that E's self-
characterization as industry or strategy experts has generally
not helped its image. It may be a relatively price-
competitive branch of consulting, but E's potential premiere
position should offset this risk.
Orqanization:
Organizationally, this strategy would involve the
loosening of the current industry orientation. Particularly
at the lower levels of the hierarchy, staff would be en-
couraged to rotate among several principals to develop an un-
derstanding and expertise in using industrial market research
techniques to analyze diverse markets. Staff members could be
drawn from the same business school base as at present. As
staff members matured and developed personal preferences for
certain industries, they could specialize in these (some of
which might be new areas for the firm). It is also possible
that the organization might be better structured around prod-
ucts which apply across industries if there are enough of
those. Most of this development would occur internally with-
out acquisitions, avoiding that historically difficult
process. Horizontal expansion would be easy and desirable (in
the future) to facilitate (or respond to) staff development.
This growth in firm size would be accompanied by a relatively
formal and multilayered hierarchical structure with line re-
sponsibilities at several levels; broadening and deepening the
organization in this manner would support the aspirations of
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current senior staff to gradually work less in the field and
to be able to retire securely. This would also entail more
senior staff emphasis on promotion, administration, and
training. Of course, the control system would have to be
somewhat redesigned to encourage new sales and staff develop-
ment.
Summary:
To summarize, this strategy:
- does not drastically alter E's current image in the
market.
- matches the expressed needs of clients. First,
they want functional expertise. Second, they want
industry knowledge.
- directly uses E's current client contacts. In
fact, through promotion these contacts could be
levered up to add to growth.
- does not require a dramatic change in consulting
style. Although internal organization rotates
lower level staff, the client-consultant relation-
ship is basically the same as at present.
- allows E to grow from its current dominant position
in the market.
- does not have the same work content or glamour as
strategic planning or general management consult-
anting.
VII.C.3.b. Industry Consulting
The second pure strategy is to become industry con-
sultants, experts in all aspects of the business environ-
ment for particular industries with the capability to give ad-
vice individually or as a team from the firm on all functional
areas. Econology has a certain amount of this orientation in
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its present strategy, especially in industries where E is a
dominant marketing consulting firm and marketing is the domin-
ant function with the industry, e.g., power systems. Under
this strategy, each SBU would fashion itself after a corres-
ponding (real or hypothetical) SBU in SRI or ADL. While this
approach involves a poorer starting position than the market
research strategy and is probably more risky, it may be clo-
ser to the personal goals of several senior staff.
Consulting Services, Description and Method:
By analogy to ADL, etc., the projects in this line
of business would be larger and more varied than those E cur-
rently conducts; this increase in the scale of projects.is
attractive, although it does not imply that principals could
quadruple the revenues they manage. These projects would
cover the gamut of micro- and microeconomic issues affecting
an industry; studies would be sufficiently distinct from each
other that more management time would be required to assure
quality. It is quite likely that the $500,000 - $1,000,000
range for annual revenues is an upper limit on the amount of
business a principal can manage no matter what the nature of
the consulting. (This is true for firms as diverse as
McKinsey, Braxton, Putnam Hayes & Bartlett, and Technomic).
Methodologies and research designs would be drawn from all
functions, obviously requiring a very multifunctional staff.
Interviews and data analysis would still be important, but on-
ly as preliminary steps to a technical analysis of what to do
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in response to the situation depicted by the data. It might
be important or useful to work for the government in con-
tracts on regulatory policy to establish credibility as ex-
perts in the workings of the affected industries. In order
to provide counseling in functions where E currently has no
in-house capability, it might be possible to subcontract
parts of projects to university faculty or small independent
consulting operations.
Client Market:
The client group for these kinds of studies is the
line management of divisions or corporations in the Fortune
500; E would have to move its contact point up the ladder in
its current client firms. Proximity to the client plus fre-
quent casual and friendly visits may be CSFs for this. This
is a risky undertaking, as it can take years to establish a
reputation at senior levels, and it is not clear that the
client firms feel a need for more firms like ADL. That is,
even if. E could build broad competence in some industries,
the clients in those industries may not have any incentive
to use E instead of ADL. These multifunctional, multi-
technical giants are strongly entrenched competition; E
should avoid pursuing this strategy in those industries al-
ready dominated by ADL or SRI, like steel or autos. This
strategy moves E to a moderate growth market which is less
price competitive than market research since it is a less
tangible product offered to more senior people in the client
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firm. A key marketing element is demonstrating technical
capabilities. Publications in professional journals are one
way of achieving this.
Organization:
To obtain staff capable of doing this work, the
firm must bring in talent in other functional areas and in-
tegrate it into the firm's current operations. This talent
can be brought from three directions, and perhaps all should
be employed. First, MBAs with functional skills can be hired.
However, it is likely an inexperienced and young employee
will get absorbed into other routine marketing operations or
will not be self-sufficient in his skills (and require fur-
ther training while on the job to develop his talents to a
state where they can be applied). Second, seasoned experts
can be hired to either train other staff or act as internal
staff to other SBUs. -Any training of principals or staff
will require a sacrifice of current sales, because they will
have to exchange billing time for study time. The political,
as well as monetary, consequences of losing sales may hinder
participation in a training program. A professional hired as
internal staff would probably remain politically subordinated
to the other principals because of his lack of direct personal
sales. A person academically self-sufficient (e.g. a PhD) and
not too concerned with managerial ascent would best fit this
position. Third, expertise can quickly be integrated into the
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firm through acquisition. The politics of this tactic are
thorny, as the new staff would be very important due to their
expertise giving them a lot of power in the organization.
This is-likely to be unsettling to current senior stafff. SCI
commented that they have found acquisitions difficult, and
Econology's history shows mixed success with acquisitions.
With or without acquisitions, it would be necessary
to shift the staff recruiting to the most prestigious business
schools and experienced consultants since this is a credibili-
ty factor for providing this kind of expert consulting. New
staff could rotate between functions but would specialize in
particular industries fairly soon; some might remain in a
pool of functional or technical experts for general assignment
when depth was needed. This would require a flatter and more
democratic organization than E now has, as there would be
greater reliance and dependence on the individual judgment and
expertise of junior staff. Also, a more sophisticated and
multifaceted control system would have to be developed to
recognize the differences in costs and profitability of dif-
ferent kinds of studies. Temple, Barker & Sloane offer multi-
functional consulting, and their control system accounts for
the significant differences in the production functions for
30
different kinds of projects. The compensation system would
also need to reward the prolonged efforts to develop business
at higher, more multifunctional levels in the client firms.
30
Interview with TBS staff member
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Summary:
This strategy is fairly risky but might yield
more interesting and varied work. It would be pursued on a
piecemeal basis to test the waters, with the strongest indus-
try principals loosening their hold on their current client
base to court the line executives of those firms. It is
doubtful whether this will be tried without a change in the
compensation system.
In summary, this strategy
- has E compete with large, entrenched, and well-
known consulting firms, e.g. SRI, ADL. In compari-
son E's image concerning industrial expertise is weak,
other than for the Power Systems and Textiles SBUs.
- requires that E be capable in many functions (e.g.,
finance, operations, marketing). Although E is
skilled in marketing, new talent in other areas
must be acquired; this may be quite expensive and/
or organizationally difficult.
- requires to cultivate new clients either in small
to medium sized firms or higher up the corporate
hierarchy than current clients. Client interviews
revealed that shifting contacts vertically in an
organization is more difficult than shifting hor-
izontally.
- requires a more complex compensation and control
system to match more varied client studies and the
integration of new talent into the firm.
- requires a flatter organization and one limited in
growth until its reputation spread.
- requires a more relaxed and intimate client-con-
sultant relationship than presently exists.
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VII.C.3.c. Strategic Planning
The third pure strategy is to enter the strategic
planning market. At present, this is a fairly attractive mar-
ket with high growth, little price competition, very large
and expensive projects. However, it is unattractive iri having
many firms, some very well established, attacking the market.
There may also be a life cycle curve for this service which
could peak out in the near future, although this is specula-
tive. In any event, Econology is probably very poorly posi-
tioned for competing in this business. First, it is generally
not perceived as capable of strategic analysis by its current
clients; beyond them it is an unknown firm. The staff are un-
familiar or inexperienced with strategic planning. While
these skills are not difficult to acquire - several in-house
seminars might be sufficient academic training - it is a risky
long shot which would take a long time to realize. However,
this option may be appropriate if it is consistent with the
goals of the firm and its staff. There does appear to be an
attraction to this practice for several E principals
Consulting Services, Description and Methods:
To become capable of strategy analysis, E should
seek to develop or awaken skills in organizational diagnosis
and the use of strategic planning methods. Several approaches
may be taken to this end. It might be possible to develop a
symbiotic relationship with an existing strategic planning
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firm like BCG to do the market opportunity analysis part of a
BCG contract. In the process of linking this analysis to
BCG's internal analysis and portfolio optimization, much could
be learned and E could build an image of association with a
major strategy firm. Then to strengthen these new strategy
muscles, E could try offering full scale strategy consulting
to medium-sized firms, perhaps those of $100 - $500 million
revenues. These firms are not the served market for the major
strategy firms. It may even be a sufficiently dynamic market
to serve as a permanent and primary client base for E's
strategy services; if not, it can serve as further training and
reputation building.
Alternative approaches to acquiring strategic talent
include those talent-acquiring alternatives discussed under
the industrial consulting strategy section. However, here the
question also arises whether or not it would be wise to acquire
a strategist to carry on his own independent practice within
E with the understanding that he would include E senior staff
on his contracts to help train them and tap their marketing
expertise. We suspect it would be very difficult to get anyone
of significant reputation to try this; even if he would, the
internal politics may be very unstable, because of current
principals feeling subordinated or fearing loss of clients to
E's strategy group. If the group is set up to handle all of
E's strategy projects, i.e. not to train other principals, then
the value of the group to other SBUs is minimized and its
strategic value and importance drops proportionately.
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Client Market:
Even if the requisite skills are developed, E must have
very close relations with the client at a very senior level
in order to get in the door for a strategy study. Several
clients commented on how it is pointless (or at least
inefficient) to have a strategy consultant who is not inti-
mately familiar with the firm. To develop this, E's prin-
cipals would have to spend much time and effort trying to
form close contact with senior executives. Once some cred-
ibility has been established, it is standard practice to
compete for jobs by giving seminars to individual corporations'
executive staffs on the consulting firm's skills and services
in strategic planning. It might even work for E to make
cold calls offering to do this; it would be helpful to have
a differentiating style or gimmick (model) to serve as bait in
these presentations.
Organization:
Organizationally, the strategy firm should be fairly flat
and democratic (like the industry consulting firm) as each
member of the staff is expected to be a high-powered expert.
There would be no industry structure - everyone would work
on any kind of project. There may be diseconomies of scale
for this kind of firm, so that E would probably not be effective
at as large a firm size as under the previous alternatives.
Summary:
The major risk in this approach stems from whether there
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are untapped markets for strategic planning services and, if
so, what does it take to establish a firm in that niche of
the market. If there are few unserved markets, or those that
are unserved are nonetheless oriented toward the major strategy
firms, this could be a very difficult track. We believe it
would take many years for E to become a competitor to Bain,
BCG, SPA, etc. if it is possible at all.
In summary, this strategy
- has E either compete in a market against well-
known cometitors (e.g. BCG) or enter a market
of unknown size, strategy consulting to medium
sized firms.
- requires E to recruit talent, which will be an
expensive and organizationally difficult process
- requires E to cultivate new clients either in
medium sized firms or higher up the corporate
hierarchy than current clients
- requires E to switch to a flat, democratic
organizational structure, and probably remain a
small firm until it establishes a reputation.
- requires a more relaxed and intimate client-consultant
relationship than presently exists.
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VII.D. Specific Strategic Recommendations
We have given an analysis of E's current position plus
four strategies presented in order of increasing difficulty,
risk, and time to realization. The last two alternatives
involve rather large organizational redesign as well. To
recommend a single strategy, we believe the second, becoming
an industrial market planning/research firm, is the best. It
should help those SBUs competing against strong industry expert
consulting firms and cannot hurt the others. It would also
focus the divergent interests of the SBUs to create more
synergy, recasting all experience as a common base for all.
Finally, there is a strong chance of becoming a major factor
in that consulting market.
However, the other alternatives are not necessarily
inferior strategies. In a sense, each strategy is simply a
trading off competitive business position for market attractive-
ness. Market planning/research has the strongest business
position and only a moderate market attractiveness; for strategy
consulting the scales are switched. To determine the proper
tradeoff would require combining the two dimensions of attractive-
ness and position into a universal single dimension of firm
utility; this subjective transformation is best left to the
decision-makers. Another group of factors not to be ignored are
the goals of the equity owners and professional staff. The
strategy that most closely fits these goals (or at least lies
within their feasible region), concerning work content, working
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conditions, retirement plans, challenges, income, etc., should
be chosen.
It may be possible to satisfy objectives with an
eclectic strategy in which E first builds on its strength as
an industrial market research firm but develops options to
pursue the industry or strategy consulting in the future. At
the entry level, this approach would look like the pure indus-
trial marketing option: the primary responsibility of new
consultants would be to become good market researchers, rotating
among industries. As they become more senior, they would be
more and more involved in the relation of marketing to other
functions at the client firms, and they would specialize in a
particular industry. As senior associates and principals-they
would be able to orchestrate a market study which was well
integrated with the client's full range of needs; their role
would be much more proactive than reactive in helping the client.
Over time, the staff may become regarded as industry experts.
To preserve the strategy option, market studies could be taken
in support of strategic planning firms. If this proved a way
to establish a reputation as strategists, the firm could move
in that direction, perhaps with smaller firms as clients.
The problem with this hybrid strategy is that it requires
extra effort to remain focused, making it difficult to promote
the firm in a manner which clearly differentiates it. It is
also difficult to control and compensate performance in this
approach, as there are even less well-defined yardsticks for
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evaluating results than under the pure strategies.
The selection of a strategy ultimately rests on the
preferences and risk aversion of the key players at Econology.
This study can only suggest alternatives relative to a small
sample of observations on the firm and its environment. Probably
the best advice we can give is for E to use this report as a
template for self-assessment, studying those aspects with which
it agrees and disagrees. This self-assessment should include
a more aggressive effort at strategy formulation and much
attention to business strategies: our study has only addressed
the corporate portfolio issues. Operational changes which could
support this process and enhance the effectiveness and efficiency
of the firm follow.
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VII.E. General Recommendations
There are certain organizational and marketing recommen-
dations which apply to all of the aforementioned strategic options.
VII.E.1 Organizational Suggestions
The first organizational suggestions include those dis-
cussed in the previous section concerning staff development.
First, internal promotion should be emphasized. This will
encourage staff development and create a more competent middle
management. Second, provide a place and person for consultants
to go to safely complain and freely air their grievances
without fear of retribution. Adopting the employees' suggestions
is another matter, but the process of discussing the issue to an
open-minded official is fruitful nonetheless. Third, whether
or not rotation of consultants through different SBUs is a
regular practice, a certain amount of employee homogeneity is
desired to facilitate occasional staff exchanges during business
slumps and peaks. The price for this flexibility is a common
standard of employment for all SBUs, so the employees have
skills corresponding to work requirements throughout the organiza-
tion. Fourth, more management effort is necessary in the areas
of corporate and SBU planning, business promotion, and staff
development. Depending on the strategy chosen, it may be con-
venient to allow the officers of the "cash cow" SBUs to assume
more of the managerial duties since the corporate de-emphasis
in their area may permit them to devote time to extra-SBU
activities.
196
The incentives to motivate adherence to these suggestions
are created through the corporate atmosphere, attitude, and, not
least important, the compensation system. Recommendations for
the compensation package concern the profit sharing (or bonus)
aspects and follow from a previous section which describes the
current salary system.
VII.E.2 Compensation System
VII.E.2.a Current System
The current compensation scheme's first order effect
on employee behavior appears to be aggressive selling. Histori-
cally, Econology has fared very well under this form of profit
sharing. The firm has grown rapidly and now enjoys a major
role in the market place. The attributes which made profit
sharing (or bonuses) successful in the past are still present:
1) the firm is relatively small, so individual efforts are not
diluted by those of a multitude of other employees. In this
way variations in individual work can have a large influence on
profits. Adding to the impact of individual impact on profits
is the nature of professional work, where high revenues are
based on each employee-client contact; 2) the work effort is
difficult and costly to monitor. Meaningful measures of per-
formance analogous to piece rate production in manufacturing
do not exist for professional services work. Sophisticated
attempts to monitor creative work can be frustrating and costly
without complete employee cooperation. Certainly this coopera-
tion is greater under some form of profit sharing, when the
employee has incentive to monitor himself.
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The issue presently is the form of profit sharing.
Principals now have greater managerial responsibilities for
staff development, product development, and promotion than they
did in the formative years of the firm. Less bonus emphasis
on sales and more on management is necessary, even though this
shifts the bonus into a subjective area. Management efforts
in many areas, besides sales, must be assessed to allocate the
bonus.
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VII.E.2.b Measuring The Efforts of Consultants:
Identifying and measuring the efforts of knowledge
employees is not a simple task, but it can be done. After the
goals of the firm are established and promulgated throughout
the organization, employee-manager interviews (or for the
principals, discussions held with officers) are conducted.
Here, answers to two very tough questions must be obtained:
1. What results are you being paid to achieve?
2. How will you be able to demonstrate to your
supervisor that you are doing a good job?
Answers to the first question comprise the "key result
areas". Strive for a complete list of results or outputs for
each job; where necessary break down key result areas into major
components. An example is shown below.
Improve E's Visibility
-Publications in professional journals
-Newsletters
-Seminars
-Public relations efforts
31Much of this section is drawn from a paper by David Mollenoff,
"How to Measure Work by Professionals," Management Review,
November 1977, pp. 39-43.
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Answers to the second question become "performance
indicators". Develop at least one indicator for each key
result component. The ideal indicator includes four measurable
factors - quantity, quality, time, and cost - but this ideal
is seldom found. Nonetheless, many possibilities abound, such
as raw numbers (e.g., 12 newsletters), ratios (50% completion
rate), rating scales (4 on a 5 point scale), or just qualitative
directions (good, average, bad). If measures cannot be for-
mulated now, agree to establish them as you go.
The standard you are striving for should be one that
a competent and diligent employee could reach on average with
reasonable effort. Manager-employee consensus should be reached,
but in those rare cases where this is impossible an understanding
will suffice.
This is extremely difficult work which may not be
completed at one sitting. In fact, initiating the program may
require many months of effort, but the rewards are significant
to an organization too complex to use a single criterion compensa-
tion package.
VII.E.2.c Bonus Pool:
A further suggestion, beyond basing bonus allocation on
management (as well as sales) effort, is to not restrict the
bonus pool by the size of current profits. Efforts by principals
in staff development may increase the value of the firm through
dramatic increases in future revenues, but at the sacrifice of
this year's sales. Why should these non-owners be penalized
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today for this wise long-run investment, when many not be around
for the distribution of future profits? Some firms solve this
problem by tying bonuses to their stock prices (a measure of
firm value which capitalizes future earnings). In E's case
the stock is not publically traded, so the bonuses must rely
heavily on the subjective assessment of top management and equity
owners to decide on financial rewards based on shifts in firm
value, independent of this year's profits. This is the optimal
approach for E to adopt. The priority to ascribe to these
recommendations must be made clear. First, alter the bonus
system for senior and middle management to properly weight
their managerial efforts. Second, expand and contract the bonus
pool according to the value added to the firm over the year,
which may be quite different from the expansion or contraction
in profits accrued over the same year. This means that the
retained earnings as a percentage of professional effort will
not be a constant figure.
VII.E.3 Marketing Suggestions
The marketing suggestions are primarily derived from
the client and competitor analysis. Although these recommenda-
tions apply "across the board" to all of the proposed strategies,
some are more significant under different scenarios. For
example, all evidence indicates Econology should increase prices,
but a shift into strategic planning allows a much more liberal
application of this' suggestion. The same holds true for client-
firm relations. 'A more relaxed and warm association would
improve business; clients would feel less hustled and would
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believe the consultant had a genuine understanding of their
organization. However, the degree of "old boy" association
depends on the strategy - strategic planning requires closer
association than industrial market research. With this caveat,
the other marketing suggestions are described.
Principals should promote for the whole firm, not just
for themselves. Surprisingly, many clients were unaware of what
Econology did outside of work done by their principal contact.
These same clients distributed much of their information about
consultants to other divisions of their firm, either directly
or through a central corporate office set up for this specific
function. E's business could be expanded within its current
client base by simply having principals present the capabilities
of the entire firm. This could be done just in discussion or
through brochures describing past marketing experience and
calendars or datebooks including descriptions of E's staff and
experience. It would be especially beneficial to stress this
type of promotion at client firms which have centralized con-
sultant referral and evaluation departments, several clients
have such departments.
Finally, E could improve its presentation and report
style. The visual appeal and clarity of reports could be
improved through the use of more prose summaries and more
elegant graphs. Presentations should adopt top-down priorities
with corporate-wide issues initially addressed followed by a
logical extension to narrower issues. Perhaps the best advice
here is for principals to carefully observe and continually
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attempt to improve and evolve the reports and presentations.
The documents and style of presentation vary considerably with
the chosen strategy. The extreme case is again strategic
planning, where often no final report is delivered to the client
and the audio-visual presentation (utilizing many gimmicks and
state-of-the-art graphical techniques) is greatly emphasized.
VII.E.4 Suggestions for Further Strategic Planning
A third area of recommendations concerns strategic
planning for Econology. Although this report documented an
entire planning cycle, many additional iterations will be
necessary to arrive at a refined and mutually agreeable (among
top management) strategic plan. Our analysis, which was
primarily limited to the corporate level, should be extended
to more granular SBU (and sub-SBU) levels. These iterations
should involve each principal examining his SBU (or proposed
SBU) in greater detail and challenging our prognosis and
conclusions, but the process in each iteration should be
basically the same as this one. With the corporate objectives
and professional goals in mind, tentative SBU objectives should
be set. These objectives should be translated into feasible
strategies and analyzed with respect to SBU resources, market
threats and opportunities. A projected SBU position should be
developed and inserted into the corporate portfolio of SBUs
to assess whether Econology's corporate objectives are satisfied;
if not the iteration continues.
Before a meaningful planning procedure can be performed,
the proper corporate climate must be fostered. Planning
202
must be elevated to a level of considerable importance and
priority in the minds of the senior executives in order for
managerial planning effort to be rewarded and the results to
be taken seriously. Until then, strategic planning, however
sophisticated, will simply be an exercise.
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VIII. CRITIQUE AND CONCLUSIONS
The most important caveat on interpreting and applying
this study is that it is based on a small information set. We
have felt somewhat like tailors being given a thread from a
piece of a man's clothing and then being asked to describe the
man's outfit and recommend a new wardrobe! Unfortunately,
time constraints prevented us from developing a large data
base.
The obvious consequence of this data inadequacy is that
the profiles of Econology's resources, client opinions, or
competitor positions are not necessarily reliable estimates of
the true distributions. We believe they are still quite in-
formative, but recognizing this limitation, we have included
interview excerpts which reflect the range of opinions more
than the mean and variance. We have also concentrated our re-
search and analysis on Econology's weaknesses slightly more
than on strengths, partly due to the interviewees' tendency to
discuss problems more than aspects with which they were satis-
fied. The result is perhaps an overly negative picture of
Econology, which should be qualified. It is quite clear that
Econology has many bright people offering a very useful ser-
vice which is highly valued in the marketplace.
It is clearly useful to have consultants offer a third-
party perspective on opportunities or inconsistencies which the
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client may not recognize. However, consultants have an equally
important role in making the implicit into the explicit, taking
the client's operating procedures, market assumptions, client
relations, etc. and laying them on the table for inspection.
This is the most significant potential contribution of this
study., We recommend Econology use the analysis for:
.goal formulation, with an awareness of the tradeoffs
between opportunity and risk in the associated stra-
tegic alternatives
.continued corporate strategy formulation, with strong
attempts made to match specific strengths and weak-
nesses with specific opportunities and risks. This
entails continued collection of a strategic intelli-
gence data base to extend or modify the information
in this case, and to develop a more reliable and
balanced profile of strengths and opportunities
The case research gave us many insights into the
strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical models of strategy
formulation. The problems of conducting a rigorous market
attractiveness/business position analysis were discussed in
Chapter II. The primary benefits from rigorous, systematic
analysis are the completeness and consistency of data and
methodologies. Our experience revealed one drawback to rigor.
The MA/BP method is so qualitative that attempting to be ex-
tremely rigorous can actually be constraining to strategic
analysis. It is possible to spend so much time worrying about
marginal shades of grey in the accuracy or meaning of data that
the distinctions become artificial and the black and white are
missed. This is e'specially critical when time is a major con-
straint. Like any problem in economics, the marginal benefits
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and costs of rigor should be equated in the strategic planning
process.
None of the strategic planning methods discussed in
this thesis are sufficient bases by themselves for prudent
corporate planning; they should be complemented and qualified
by the ideas of organizational behaviour, finance, and micro-
economics. Organizational diagnosis is particularly important
in planning for professional service organizations like Econo-
logy, where each member of the staff is almost a complete
business, performing the full gamut of functions for the firm:
marketing, production, and client relations. Any decisions on
goals, quality control, resource allocations, etc. should re-
flect the needs of the individuals and the norms of the organi-
zations operation. Finance theory provides the discipline of
insisting that the corporate portfolio concept only has merit
when true synergies exist between SBUs. It also provides a
method for setting appropriate, quantitative objectives for
the performance of SBUs and the firm as a whole. Microeco-
nomics is a source of factors to be used in analyzing markets.
In general this list is much richer than most established
strategic planning models use. Moreover, the concepts of mi-
croeconomics should always be applied to test the assumptions
about firms and markets implied by the tools to be used for
strategic planning.
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